# THE FORTNIGHTLY

OCTOBER, 1941

## RECONSTRUCTION AND THE U.S.S.R.

BY BALBUS

THE entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war has altered our outlook in every field of activity, from the immediate and military to the long-range and ideological. Not least, it is bound to affect our ideas on reconstruction, that crucial period when, after the war is over, the peace will be won or lost.

For Reconstruction, the most important fact arising from Russia's alignment with the democracies is that it makes a final solution of the security problem much more readily possible. The problem of security has two facets, one politico-military, the other socio-economic. The possibility of co-operation between the three U's, as we may call the three great centres of power that will be in existence after the end of the war—the U.S.A., the U.K. (as the centre of the British Commonwealth), and the U.S.S.R.—is important for both.

In the politico-military sphere, the land-power of the U.S.S.R. is complementary to the sea-power of the Anglo-Saxon democracies, so that the combination of the two could render any concentrations of power in the intermediate zones quite impotent or at any rate (even in such unlikely events as an amalgamation of French and German or of Chinese and Japanese power) of secondary importance.

Equally important, the combination of the U powers is a world combination, not a merely regional one. If once co-operation between them is assured, questions such as the constitution or the boundaries of a federated Europe become secondary, while previously they were primary. Many people had been toying with the idea of federation in some form. But after the details had been thrashed out—of true Federation as against loose Commonwealth, of a basis of democratic institutions for union as against a geographical one, a graver problem remained. The union was a regional or a partial one. Even if it were successfully accomplished, the next phase of history could only be envisaged as one where the potentially hostile units had become fewer and bigger, but in which unity had by

no means been established. The Union of Europe, the Far East, the Americas, the U.S.S.R.—these or other similar dinosauric competitors would be the units of power politics.

Assured co-operation between the three U's, though not in itself a world union, is already on a world scale, so that no alternative combination could successfully raise its head. It would be a world nucleus, out of which a true world organization could readily grow, and in which a European Commonwealth could play its proper rôle.

Co-operation seems to begin most easily in strategical matters, as we have seen very clearly in the increasing closeness of Anglo-American rapprochement. The post-war co-operation of the three U powers must be based on strategical realities. Do not let us forget that Russia's incorporation of the Baltic states, like its invasion of Finland, was primarily inspired by urgent strategic needs, no less than America's bartering of destroyers for Caribbean bases and its occupation of Iceland. Admittedly the actions of the U.S.S.R. in satisfying its strategic requirements were more brutal, but the U.S.S.R. is in certain ways a primitive country, and the U.S.A. did not have Germany on its doorstep.

The leasing of strategic bases by one power to another is one of the discoveries of the present war. Given good will on both sides, security can be thus attained without political interference. There may be more difficulty over Hangö, for instance, than over Trinidad, owing to the tradition of hostility to Russia among the Finns, but such difficulties should not be insuperable: leasing is in any case better than suffering military conquest! If in addition certain strategic points can be converted into " security depots " where supplies of modern armaments are piled up under an extended Lease-Lend principle, and contingents from various countries in the security bloc can be trained in their use, a further great advance will have been made.

In any case, we must remember that, as centuries of history have shown, the frontiers which Russia must attempt to hold on purely strategical grounds are considerably to the west of what it would desire to hold if security from aggression from the west could be thoroughly guaranteed. In general, we can be sure that the U.S.S.R. will wish for a rapprochement in the politico-military sphere to ensure that defence needs do not interfere with its reconstruction and further economic development: the degree of its collaboration with Britain and the U.S.A. will depend in large measure on the degree and the

genuineness of their willingness to extend a co-operative hand from their side.

But in the economic sphere, co-operation will be just as important, and perhaps in its immediate results even more essential. There are two chief zones of political instability in the present-day set-up of the world. One runs from Helsinki and Danzig to Suez and the Red Sea, through Poland, the eastern Balkans, Syria and Palestine; the other from Manchukuo and Vladivostok through eastern China, French Indo-China and the Philippines to the East Indies. They are like gigantic fault-lines in the tectonics of the world's political structure. They owe their peculiarly dangerous qualities, their capacity for generating political earthquakes, chiefly to this— that they combine economic backwardness and political inexperience with propinquity to powerful and highly organized neighbours on both sides. Further, they separate 'have' and 'have not' powers. The U.S.S.R. enjoys a high degree of economic self-sufficiency and is in no need of additional *Lebensraum*, while the reverse is true of Germany on the one side and of Japan on the other. The combination generates a tension that may easily become irresistible. If the tension in these zones could be reduced, an important step would have been taken towards world peace.

We may in the first place observe that these fault-lines border the great block of the U.S.S.R. on its two sides. In the second place there is the fact that the areas along them are badly in need of development if they are to play an adequate rôle in world trade and if their populations are to reach a reasonable standard of health and prosperity. The redevelopment of China after the Japanese 'incident' will itself be a major operation. In general, these regions are much over-agriculturalized, and there is need to embark on a huge programme of building, engineering, and simple and secondary industry in order both to transfer population from the land and to raise the general standard of life. The alternative, as practised by Germany before the war in south-eastern Europe, was to keep them as 'colonies' producing raw material, tying them down to certain channels of trade by barter agreements, and using them as consumers of surplus armaments.

But development is likely to be haphazard if it is entrusted to private enterprise. The lesson of the last few decades is that large-scale development should be planned and entrusted to powerful organizations of an official nature. In democratic countries, the Tennessee Valley Authority (T.V.A.) is the most

striking example. Even in the restricted sphere of commerce and trade, unified and official organizations have been playing increasingly important rôles. The U.K.C.C. (United Kingdom Commercial Corporation) has been very active in encouraging British trade in relatively backward areas; and in the socialized economy of the U.S.S.R., special trading bodies for special purposes and particular regions are necessary organs.

However, if we cannot get beyond a national basis, we shall be inviting nationalist collisions over trade, in which the various national organizations will be competing with each other to the eventual detriment of all.

What is required is clear enough. It is the establishment of international organizations for the development of various backward areas of the world, so that the task may be undertaken co-operatively instead of competitively. Concretely, we need at the very outset an Eastern European and an East Asian Development Agency. (We need others too—one for Africa, one for the Near East, and so forth; but that is another story). And on these it is essential that British, American, and Soviet credit and planning talent shall co-operate. It will probably be best to make our first step the establishment of economic co-operation between Britain and the U.S.A., partly because the prime need of the U.S.S.R. immediately after the war is likely to be internal reconstruction, and partly because of the possibility of ideological difficulties making a triangular agreement more difficult. By the time the Anglo-American system had proved its worth, the U.S.S.R. would be more likely to be ready for such ventures, and it would also be more likely to join in a going concern. Other countries could and should of course be brought in too, but for long-range success, the co-operation of the three U's is essential.

There is a still further advantage inherent in such International Development Agencies. It is not merely that to prepare the way for them now will prevent head-on clashes between our own organizations and those of the U.S.S.R. in their quest for trade in S.E. Europe, or between the U.S.S.R. and the United States in China. There is also the fact that collaboration of this sort is necessary to allow for the participation of Germany. In a nationalistically competitive world, German organizations for trade and development could be nothing but dangerous rivals. But once a sufficiently strong international organization has been built up, Germany can be safely and profitably invited in. There will be many difficulties, of principle and of detail, but they cannot be discussed here. In

any case, do not let us forget that German participation, notably in south-eastern Europe, is in the long run essential. So long as Germany cannot dictate economic terms or become a monopolistic *Herrenvolk*, it is all to the good to have an outlet for German skill and energy and products in the building up of the European standard of existence. Thus the same general principles apply in the economic field and in that of military security. In both cases, an effective co-operative arrangement is necessary. Without a water-tight politico-military security system, the U.S.S.R. will be forced to try for a strategic frontier a good deal to the west of its natural frontier, and thus expose itself to counter-efforts by powers to the westward, as well as to the trouble of controlling essentially alien territory. Without a thorough-going organization for economic collaboration, each of the great powers will be impelled to develop trade for its own benefit in the smaller and relatively backward countries, and thus to come up against similar drives from other powers, with constant friction as a result. And with the aid of effective systems for security and economic co-operation, including arrangements for organizing European industry on a "transnational" or non-nationalist basis wherever possible, Germany can be incorporated fully and functionally into the European organism, whereas without such systems Germany must remain in the anomalous position of a foreign body in its own continent—neither wholly of Europe nor wholly outside it, in an uneasy relation in which co-operation is constantly balanced against fear, and unity against hostility.

The final point to be made is ideological. Europe must be reconstructed upon a framework of ideas. Whose ideas shall they be? Up till recently, it was natural to assume that this ideological framework would be Anglo-Saxon; once persuade Britain and the U.S.A. to agree on a few general principles, and the rest would follow. But the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war has changed all that. There seems not the slightest likelihood now of a Russian surrender, or of a Vichy government in the U.S.S.R. Even if the Soviet Armies were to suffer a serious defeat, the U.S.S.R., we may prophesy, will go on a serious defeat, the U.S.S.R., we may prophesy, will go on fighting a China war from the interior. In fact we have to face the opposite possibility. The U.S.S.R. may shatter Hitler's armies and Nazi morale so thoroughly that the German collapse will arrive like a thief in the night. If Britain has before then no new major military successes to its credit, and if Britain and the U.S.A. together have made no approaches to the U.S.S.R.

with regard to reconstruction and post-war policy in general, Russian ideas may dominate the mind of Europe and provide the new framework upon which reconstruction must painfully build, and the Anglo-Saxon democracies will have very little say in the matter. A bolshevized Germany, with a communist France and northern Italy, are obvious possibilities. So is an agrarian revolution,—"green revolution"—in the predominantly agricultural and Slav areas of eastern and south-eastern Europe.

Most of us in the western Democracies would regret it if the U.S.S.R. and its ideas were to be able not merely to share in but to dictate the form of European reconstruction. One way to ensure that we and our ideas shall play their due part is by deeds: but that depends on military events. Another is to embark upon a bold policy of political leadership. A necessary corollary to this, however, is a maximum of rapprochement in the ideological sphere, remembering that in the material sphere the U.S.S.R. has not much to offer Europe in the immediate future. Various Ministers, notably Mr. Eden in recent months, have spoken of the new order which we are planning for Europe. It would seem urgently necessary to work that out in considerable detail (at the moment, apart from particular aspects like the storage and allocation of surpluses, it remains very nebulous), to make sure of American agreement on broad lines, such as commodity control, security plans, the setting up of an official Reconstruction Commission, etc., and then, again with American agreement, to see how this could be adapted to fit in with Soviet ideas. Once more co-operation must if possible be substituted for competition, and a head-on collision of those explosive entities, ideas, avoided in Central Europe.

The Russians have, since their entry into the war, proclaimed that Communism is not for export, and have in their propaganda eulogized the freedom of the democracies. If the democracies show a willingness to co-operate in a progressive spirit, the U.S.S.R. will have no desire to wage a war of ideas against them in western Europe. Two things seem to be necessary. First, a cessation of ideological hostility and suspicion between the U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-Saxon countries. We should give up sniping at Soviet godlessness and absolutism, and cease talking of the Red menace to our free institutions; they in their turn should cease erecting the relics of our rapidly changing capitalism into a target, and should cease disrupting Labour and Socialist Parties from within.

The second necessity is for the two great *blocs* to recognize that their ideas can be complementary. Some sort of New Deal democratic planning for western and central Europe, shading off into the nationalist type of Communism for which the U.S.S.R. seems to be heading, viâ some form of "green revolution," perhaps linked with a pan-Slav movement, in the agricultural countries of eastern Europe—this would not be undesirable if the eastern and western areas of Europe were not too sharply delimited politically, nor should it be impossible of achievement. But to achieve it we must start some serious re-thinking.

## THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

### *A Discussion on the P.E.P. Broadsheet*

Last month THE FORTNIGHTLY began a discussion on the P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning) broadsheet *The Future of Germany.* Contributors to that issue were Viscount Sankey, Professor Ernest Barker, Miss Storm Jameson and Lord Ponsonby. P.E.P. instituted their enquiry under three headings: I. Analysis of the situation; 2. The immediate post-war period; 3. The long run policy towards Germany. Their conclusions under these three headings were published in our September number. This month we give a further four opinions on the broadsheet.

### From VISCOUNT CECIL

This interesting broadsheet on *Planning* produced by P.E.P. has many valuable features. Among them is a sketch of the present situation of Germany in International Affairs. That is a necessary preliminary to any discussion of the future. But we must go further and try to form some conception of how Germany has got herself and Europe into the present position. Further, we cannot treat Europe in isolation. Europe is part of the World just as the United Kingdom is part of Europe. No permanent settlement can succeed which does not, for instance, deal with the Asiatic situation. Indeed, it may well prove that the Asiatic problems are more obviously vital for the British Empire than those which distract Europe.

The last war and the present one differ from previous international contests in being World Wars. They did not arise from local disputes as to territory or the like, which, once settled, need not again disturb peace. No doubt the occasion of the war of 1914 was the controversy between Serbia and Austria. But anyone who casts his mind back to international history in the thirty or forty years before that date, will agree that much larger causes were at work than any question as to the responsibility for the murder at Serajevo. And in the present war it is plain that the German invasion of Poland was only an incident in a movement which challenged the whole basis of international relations.

In other words, our controversy with Naziism largely depends on an ideological difference and if we are to succeed in building a structure of peace that will have any chance of enduring, we must keep in mind what it is that the Nazis profess. There is no obscurity about it. The Nazi view is that the duty of the citizen to the state is unqualified by any ordinary considerations of morality. It is similar to the old doctrine of passive obedience, except that it does not necessarily involve any belief in the divine Government of the world. The State—the Germanic idea—is itself divine, or has divine attributes, whether it is thought to have derived them from the act of God or not. Once this position is granted, all the rest of the Nazi policy follows. If the State is divine, it is the duty of its rulers to devote themselves wholeheartedly to securing its prosperity and power and it is the duty of all their subjects unreservedly to obey their orders. No obligation of truth or justice, as generally understood, can be pleaded against the interest of the State. Mercy and pity are irrelevant. Should it be objected that if the German State is divine, then so are other states, the answer is that it may be the duty of a foreigner to fight for his State but it is none the less the duty of the German to kill him, if that is in the interest of Germany. The only way to settle which State is right in an international dispute is to enquire which is the strongest; and, since Germans must believe in Germany, they must also believe that she is the strongest and her people are a *Herrenvolk*, to whom others must submit. Evidently this kind of creed is inconsistent with any acceptance of individual responsibility to a universal God and therefore all forms of Christianity and Judaism must be treated by a Nazi Government as depending on what is essentially a seditious point of view.

So long as a country as powerful as Germany is dominated by these views, international peace and progress can never be fully secured. Mere repression will not be sufficient to cure this evil, nor can it be relied on as an instrument of spiritual conversion. Indeed, coercion by itself may easily degenerate into acceptance of the Nazi point of view. That the exercise of force is essential to any international settlement, I do not doubt. But it must be used exclusively and avowedly in support of freedom, truth and justice and never as a substitute for those principles. That has been the rule in the national life of our country and of others for many generations and elaborate machinery has been devised to make it effective. One of the first precautions taken has been to forbid anyone from

himself enforcing his own claims or rights. No one, it is said, must be judge in his own cause, no, not even the King, as was laid down at Runnymede. I look, therefore, with some anxiety on proposals by which the European majority or British sea and air power are to be entitled to enforce any view that seems to them just, without any prior definition of the occasions of such action or any machinery for securing an impartial decision as to what justice actually requires. Such an arrangement is advocated as applying the conception of the British Commonwealth to international organization. That seems to me a misleading contention. No doubt the British Commonwealth is based on voluntary agreement of undefined extent rather than on coercive rules and it has had a considerable measure of success. But it must be remembered that the historic, racial and linguistic forces in the Empire in favour of united action have been very strong and have no counterpart in Europe. Nor is there any idea of compelling any member of the Commonwealth to take or refrain from taking any action. Generally speaking, there has been no desire for aggression by one section of the Commonwealth on others and therefore no provision to secure unity of action has been necessary. But that has not succeeded in the case of Eire and has never been fully applied in the case of India or the Crown Colonies. Moreover, it is essential to remember that an international settlement must be acceptable, not only to us but to other nations. I cannot see how any such plan could be made to work in the case of Russia or China, nor how it would enable the smaller countries of Europe to feel secure against aggression by their bigger neighbours. Our fleet and air force are ultimately very powerful, but their protection would not be submitted to by the larger powers, nor would they give to the smaller continental countries confidence that immediate action necessary to save them from invasion would be taken. Indeed, the essence of these proposals does not differ very much from the German New Order, except that it substitutes Britain for Germany and is destitute of any adequate land force to support it.

Another objection to the proposals is that it precludes any admission of Germany to any form of international co-operation till she has completely abandoned her present attitude. That means that she is to be occupied and administered for an indefinite and certainly lengthy period by foreign forces, in the control and management of which she has no share. I do not believe that in practice the British will long consent to playing the part of international gaolers and I am sure that it is the

very worst way of producing a change of heart in Germany. No doubt ample precautions must be taken to prevent any renewed aggression by the Germans. That certainly will involve her disarmament, rigidly controlled. But, beyond that, the greatest amount of freedom possible should be allowed to her, provided she does not use it to the detriment of her neighbours. Further, even her disarmament should be, as far as possible, of a nature which can safely be extended in due time to other countries. In other words, the Germans must, from the outset, be shewn that we desire their collaboration in a peace based on freedom, truth and justice as soon as that can safely be arranged and that it rests with them to prove that they can be trusted for that purpose.

That is the only way that we can help the Germans to recover from their present criminal delusions. They must cure themselves. We can do no more than promote international conditions which will encourage them to make the effort while maintaining all the safeguards necessary to prevent outbreaks by them. It is as true in moral as in material matters that those who would be free themselves must strike the blow.

On one point I am in full agreement with the writers of the broadsheet. Peace can only be secured by the efforts of the peace-loving powers, of which Britain must be the leader. That is vital and it means a considerable change of view on our part. We must never again say or think that we need only concern ourselves with our interests—meaning thereby our territorial and commercial property. Or, rather, we must recognize that it is only in a system based on freedom, truth and justice that our interests—in the widest sense—are safe. We must, therefore, be ready to make every effort and, if need be, every sacrifice, with the object of maintaining such a system. I do not believe we can do it by ourselves. We must have the help of all those countries which are willing to give it and can be trusted to take the necessary action, for two reasons. In the first place the task would be too burdensome for us alone. We want the immense resources of America, we want the man power of Russia and from Asia we want the strength of China. And, secondly, we want the moral support of as many civilized nations as we can get. We want to harness their deeply rooted national feeling—or patriotism—to the cause of international peace. That can only be done by respecting and encouraging their independence, the deep love of which is in itself both natural and admirable. If anyone doubts it, he has merely to consider the prodigious disaster which

Germany is incurring for herself and, I fear, creating for others, by the attempt to trample upon the independence of the occupied countries.

Therefore, believing as I do that the international problems before us are pre-eminently ideological, I am convinced that they cannot be solved by ignoring national feelings, or even by relying only on an increase of welfare and prosperity internationally, desirable as that is. Patriotism, nationalism, sovereignty, independence—call it what you will—is an immensely powerful force for which men are prepared to sacrifice their lives and everything they possess. We have rightly appealed to it as one of our great sources of strength in the present war and it must be one of the foundations on which peace will be built. That is fully recognized in the Atlantic Charter. Some modification of sovereignty is essential to international co-operation. But, if we are wise, we shall limit that interference to those matters which directly touch the safety and prosperity of other countries.

For that and other reasons, I am against trying to build peace on vague understandings, for the same reason that the first necessity of a good national law is that it should be clear and definite and enforced by impartial third-party action. It is impossible to enter here into details of international machinery, which I have tried to do elsewhere. Nor can I discuss the economic proposals made in the broadsheet. To me, the two vital principles for international organization are the supremacy of the law and the conviction in all countries that the preservation of world peace is the greatest of all national interests.

## From THE DUCHESS OF ATHOLL, D.B.E.

P.E.P. are to be congratulated on having faced up to the probable necessity for the Allies to occupy a large part of German territory at the end of the war. It seems strange, however, that they should think so strong a measure possible without the preliminary signature of an armistice. Surely the purpose of an armistice is to ensure that the defeated belligerent is no longer a danger to the victor? To that end strategic points and weapons, or at least the more specially powerful ones, are handed over at a stated time and it is recognized that this ends warfare on any organized scale. The broadsheet indeed envisages that the Allies on occupying German territory will "take charge of all military equipment," but surely, even

if Nazi leadership be discredited by defeat, there may still remain at least large sections of the armed forces to be reckoned with, who will not be prepared to hand over their arms without orders from their own military leaders. It should not be forgotten that the German officer caste consistently obstructed the work of the Allied Disarmament Commission between 1919 and 1925. To attempt the seizure of all military equipment without the assent, however reluctant, of defeated military leaders, might well expose the Allied forces to unnecessary difficulties and dangers—all the more if, as apparently desired by the writers of the broadsheet, Germany should have suffered no general and crushing defeat—only "a series of limited although major reverses in particular fields."

As compared with the military risks involved in such a proposal the broadsheet's fear that Hitler's prestige would be maintained by his possible nomination of the negotiators of an armistice seems ill-founded. Might not the negotiators equally probably be nominated by men who had overthrown him?

Again P.E.P. show courage in recognizing that for a time Germany may have to be administered by an Allied Reconstruction Commission. Such a Commission would at least be necessary for economic reasons, and probably, as suggested, to "hold the ring" while representative institutions were being restored by Germans. But is it quite consistent to desire (p. 12) that a Reconstruction Commission should be set up "well before a German collapse reached an advanced stage" and yet to hold the opinion that "there is no reason why we should not let the disintegration run its course because we need no longer, as in 1919, fear that Germany will go Bolshevik"? Yet it is recognized that disintegration "is likely to be much more complete in the present war than in 1918."

Moreover, can anyone predict with confidence what will be the predominant trend of political opinion in Germany after the war? Hundreds of thousands of Germans have suffered far greater terrors under Hitler than any did under the Kaiser's rule, and that may tend to incline at least some to extreme policies.

But perhaps the most surprising proposal of the broadsheet is that the countries occupied by Germany are to be subject for a period to much the same administration as Germany herself. On page 11 it is proposed that they should share in the "emergency military administration" of occupying forces, in order that there may be created "as strong a bulwark against disorders and lawless seizures of territory as conditions may

require;" and page 12 (d) appears to suggest that the Allied Reconstruction Commission will also for a time be administering these countries, "the only difference being that it will in Germany be a much larger and longer task to create vigorous representative institutions on which local, national and functional responsibilities can be devolved as peace-time activities are resumed."

Granted that all German-occupied countries will need revictualling and other economic and humanitarian help, and that in these fields an Allied Reconstruction Commission may well operate, what grounds are there for assuming the need to "create" vigorous representative institutions in such countries as Norway, Holland, Belgium and Denmark? The institutions are already there in being, only, in the meantime, gagged. The Nazi gag once removed, little vigour should be lacking.

Or even in France, where for the moment some Frenchmen have tampered with time-honoured democratic institutions, will other Frenchmen not be equal to the task of restoring them? Or are the Czechs not capable of re-creating the institutions they set up under the leadership of men still in mature and vigorous life?

And how is it consistent with our declared aim of ensuring national independence to all European countries that the many sovereigns and governments of occupied territories who have chosen exile rather than bow the knee to Hitler should be kept knocking at the doors of their countries after hostilities have ended? If this became known as a part of British policy could anything be imagined more likely to discourage the resistance by their oppressed peoples which we all wish to stimulate? Or could there be anything more certain to weaken the help these rulers and governments are giving to the Allied cause? It could scarcely fail to be regarded by them as a breach of faith.

And how can such a dictatorial proposal find a place in the battle for democracy? Is it not a fundamental principle of the system that a nation must have the right to choose its own form of government? Indeed, since the broadsheet was published, this principle has been affirmed in the Atlantic Charter, and to it we are solemnly pledged.

The proposal that an Allied Reconstruction Commission should administer alike Germany and the territories she has oppressed is not the only sign the broadsheet gives of a failure to discriminate clearly enough between the policies pursued respectively by Germany and the countries opposed to her.

It tells us that it is "the false and short-sighted policies" followed, though "in their very different ways," by the German, Russian, British and American Nations which have "led all of them into a state of the most acute emergency": and while it insists that Germans must "once and for all be deprived of the remotest possibility of again attacking the liberties and lands of their neighbours" it equally demands that "Europeans must once and for all put an end to the chronic muddle and disunity which keeps all peoples of the Continent, except a small minority along its North-Western fringes and a few favoured groups elsewhere, in a state of perpetual poverty and insecurity." Is this really a true picture, even from the economic point of view? And if viewed from the political angle, does it take account of the difficulty of achieving unity among nations speaking so many different languages and heirs of many different and often conflicting racial traditions? Europe long paid a heavy price for the temperate climate and fertile soil which bore her vigorous and too often ambitious sons, and which attracted to her successive waves of other races from less favoured zones. But in spite of these many linguistic and traditional differences, only Germany has caused any major threat to European security for over one hundred years. Granted that there have been mistakes of policy in all four countries named, is it helpful to an un-biassed understanding of present events to distribute the blame so evenly?

More especially, is it true to say that "real leadership and opening of opportunity" to Europe in general and to Germany in particular "was asked in vain of the lazy and fuddled England of the twenties?" Have the writers forgotten that the year 1925 saw our pledge, given at Locarno, to grant to Germany the same whole-hearted aid in the event of an unprovoked attack by France, as we then at last promised to France if attacked again by Germany? The history of any country can I believe be searched in vain for any such act of generosity towards an ex-enemy given within seven years of the close of a long and devastating war. At the time it was hailed throughout this country and Europe as ushering in a new era of peace and conciliation, and it is by no means the least of the achievements of Hitlerite propaganda to have succeeded in making many people in this country apparently forget this pledge and its significance.

Finally, though it is satisfactory to find the broadsheet stressing the prime need for "future public safety" the proposals to

"so decentralize, distribute and safeguard military and economic power, both actual and potential, as to make threats by organized minorities such as the Germans as unreal as the threat of a rebellion by Yorkshire or Brittany" hardly seems a practical method of securing it. Decentralization of military power suggests that Germany will be allowed to retain arms, though elsewhere her "rearmament" is assumed to be impossible; and surely the suggested analogy with Yorkshire and Brittany is misleading? Eighty million Germans are certainly a minority of the inhabitants of Europe as a whole, but, apart from Russia, they are by far the largest European community that speaks the same language and is ruled by the same Government; they occupy a central position the strategic advantages of which are obvious, whereas the "majority" of Europeans are divided into a large number of national units for reasons already referred to. Many of them are small and separated from each other by Germany. Combined defence between them must obviously be far more difficult to organize than in a homogeneous community, without any imputation of "muddle" or ill-will. There is no parallel whatever with Yorkshire or Brittany, which for centuries past have been absorbed in larger national units and therefore control no armed forces of their own.

Elsewhere the broadsheet betrays what many will think dangerous optimism as to the measures necessary to the maintenance of security. While it wisely deprecates the hasty drafting of a European constitution, federal or other, its desire for a European "Statute of Westminster" rather than for a League Covenant appears to indicate a dislike for any form of obligation between nations for mutual defence against unprovoked aggression. Surely the fact that the Statute of Westminster made clear the Dominions' complete control of their foreign policy was a factor on which Hitler counted to prevent the entire strength of the Empire being employed against him in the event of war with Britain? And would the League's collective policy have failed had its members not continued to discuss disarmament long after the withdrawal of Hitler's delegates in October, 1933, and his intention declared at the same time of leaving the League made this no longer a realist policy? Had the nations concerned had the courage frankly to recognize this and to proceed to rearm according to their respective responsibilities, the collective policy could have been maintained in this country with general assent. If it had been resolutely adhered to by a strongly armed Britain and France,

with Russia supporting it as she did from 1934 onwards, Europe might well have been saved the present catastrophe.

The indication given in the Eighth Point of the Atlantic Charter that, while seeking practical measures to lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments, Britain and the United States will not pledge themselves to disarm to the level to which aggressor nations will be required to conform, surely gives us at least one ground for a better hope than we have yet had for the future security of tortured Europe.

**From Professor GILBERT MURRAY, O.M.**

I find the broadsheet issued by P.E.P. on the Future of Germany very able and interesting. I agree entirely with the introductory statement on the necessity of " putting an end to the chronic muddle and disunity " of Europe and the imperative obligation which this lays upon Great Britain with—or even without—the co-operation of the U.S.A. and of Russia. The analysis of the situation also seems to me generally convincing, especially in the contrast between Bismarck's undertaking and Hitler's.

I find it impossible, however, to envisage any satisfactory conclusion to the war without an armistice. Such a policy would imply a complete unconditional surrender of the whole country, which would only be conceivable after an absolutely overwhelming defeat and economic collapse. At some time or other the fighting must definitely stop, and it can only be stopped by an armistice signed by some recognized military authority. Without such an armistice, though it is possible that certain particular defeated armies might collapse and melt away, it is almost certain that there would be in remoter places patriotic leaders, regular or irregular, who would continue to resist. The appeal they would make to the average patriotic German would be almost irresistible. " Our main armies are defeated, but even the defeated have rights. We are required to hand ourselves over, bound hand and foot, to the discretion of our deadly enemies. I answer that we prefer death." The armistice would, I imagine, be negotiated with the Commander in Chief of the German forces, whose orders would command the obedience of all loyal soldiers and would make any further resistance an act of rebellion. I think, therefore, that the supposed difficulty of recognizing a possibly reactionary or revolutionary government does not arise at this point.

It must however arise soon after. It seems to me quite necessary that the Allies should take over the responsibility of keeping the peace in Germany. The broadsheet is convincing here. But it is surely quite impracticable for an army of foreign invaders to undertake *ex tempore* the whole government of the country. They must have their instrument, and that instrument can only be the existing native German administrative machine. This implies a German government rather like the Pétain government in France, willing and ready to co-operate with the conquerors. The parallel is, of course, not encouraging; but that is only because it is not exact. For one thing, France is not completely subdued and helpless; for another, the Pétain government is required to co-operate in the further spoliation and humiliation of its country, whereas the supposed German government would be asked to co-operate in the protection of Germany from the lawless revenge of her victims and in the restoration of her social and economic stability. I see no insuperable difficulty in the way of discovering a practical co-operative government, commanding the allegiance or at least the acquiescence of that large mass of public opinion which, however disorganized, inarticulate, and helpless at present, has been gradually growing more united in opposition to the Nazi tyranny. I confess I see no possibility of administering Germany without one.

I agree that the disintegration of a defeated Germany is likely to be much more complete than it was in 1918, but I am startled and even shocked by the suggestion that we should "let this disintegration run its course." Disintegration may take many forms, all of them involving much human suffering; but among them will certainly be widespread and bloody outbreaks of revenge for the unspeakable cruelties inflicted by the Nazis on Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Jews and other victims. If such revenge affected only the individuals actually guilty of ordering or committing the atrocities in question it could hardly be blamed; but no such limitation is likely or indeed possible. One of the principal duties of the Allied Occupation in its first year will surely be the prevention of these excesses and the general maintenance of law and order. We must not wink at mob massacres.

Lastly on page 14 comes an argument which, I confess, seems to me to be based on pure illusion. Because the British Dominions, united by a common history, a common allegiance, a common language, history, law, and the many psychological characteristics which make us all seem normal to one another

and unintelligible to foreigners, can get on comparatively well without any written constitution except the very sketchy Statute of Westminster, it is argued that the same loose and happy-go-lucky method will suit the nations of Europe, full of diversities of language, law, custom, race and history, and most of them haunted by traditions of ancient enmity. The two cases are fundamentally different. A man may sometimes run a farm or business with his brother without any formal deed of partnership; but if he has to take as partner a stranger, and a stranger whom he does not particularly trust, clear agreements become a necessity. As a matter of fact this peculiar British reluctance to make "commitments" or accept definite obligations has been one of the chief causes of trouble between this country and France and consequently of the failure of the League. The obligations to collective defence in Article XVI. of the Covenant were far from precise; the British government would never—except in the one case of the Locarno treaties—agree to any clearer and more limited obligation, and the French always complained that they could never rely upon us or know what we intended to do. This was one of the main arguments used by those in France who maintained that *l'alliance Boche*, however unsatisfactory, would be safer and steadier than *l'alliance Anglaise*.

Our objection to "commitments" is no doubt chiefly due to intellectual laziness encouraged, or made possible, by our long insular security; but the argument is sometimes used that "commitments" are somehow inconsistent with democracy. The House of Commons, it is argued, is supreme; and no one can bind a future House of Commons or tell how it will act when the *casus foederis* arises. A different party with different views may be in power. If this contention were true it would prove too much. It would prove that Great Britain was not a continuous unity, but only a series of governments without any consistency or sense of honour; an Ishmaelite nation whose word could never be trusted though its habits might be speculated upon, and whose policy varied with the convenience of the moment. Such a nation could obviously never be the trusted leader of a great international system. Fortunately, in spite of this isolationist fear of "commitments," no House of Commons has ever, so far as I know, actually claimed the right to repudiate treaties made by previous Houses. Parliament has preferred loyally to accept Lord Eldon's dictum: "It is highly indecent to discuss whether the King will keep his word."

My main point of difference from the broadsheet is that while I agree with all that is there argued about the necessity of this country accepting a large permanent responsibility for the guidance and reorganization of Europe, I am convinced that such a policy involves of necessity our accepting certain definite obligations and commitments, clearly defined and scrupulously carried out. The field of such obligations should, I think, be limited; I will not discuss the limits now. But it seems to me quite unreasonable to expect the nations of Europe to give their trust to a foreign power which comes in with overwhelming force and refuses to be bound by any treaty.

## From LORD ADDISON

The authors of the July *Planning* broadsheet on *The Future of Germany* have produced, I think, the most useful contribution that has yet appeared to the study of this terribly difficult subject. It does one good to come across such a fine constructive effort; and, in that respect, I associate myself heartily with the September contributors.

It is imperative that we must somehow obtain in the future those "Emancipations from Fear" that President Roosevelt has so forcibly called for. How to do so when Nazi Germany has been defeated is the most important problem before the civilized world to-day.

There cannot be any doubt that success mainly depends upon having a German people that will abandon war as an instrument of national policy and that will be a trustworthy and willing partner in the Comity of Nations, instead of devoting, as the broadsheet says, its "great energy, courage and resources for the purpose of destroying other peoples liberty and looting their possessions." But this means a fundamental change in the temper and outlook of the German people, and we cannot expect that either to develop or to continue unless there are equally fundamental changes in the pre-war conceptions of national sovereignty as well as in economic affairs.

So far as the Germans themselves are concerned, I agree entirely that we cannot look for the abandonment of war worship unless the whole cruel thing has been thoroughly discredited in their own homeland through the experience themselves of a sufficient dose of the widespread destruction they have inflicted on others. It is a hard thing to say; but no other conclusion seems possible. They have not so far experienced it, except by air raids, and the Prussian military

cult was not dethroned by the last war. Hitlerism had, as its ready-made and willing instruments, two powerful and generally accepted convictions. First, that their armies had not been defeated in the last war and second that the Germans were a superior race called upon to subjugate others and rule by force. The notion of ruling by consent of the governed has never yet entered their scheme of things.

We have this also to bear in mind as a shorter-term consideration. Although Hitlerism and all it implies will become more discredited as the privations and sufferings of the war accumulate, many Germans will be willing to go on enduring because of the dread that another, and perhaps a worse, repetition of the horrors of the post-Versailles period, would be the sequel of defeat. The removal of this dread endows with enormous importance the declaration in the Churchill-Roosevelt Atlantic Agreement, to the effect that, provided war making can be abandoned, the German people, in common with the rest of the world, will be fed and given the oportunity to lead a useful life amongst the nations. The more this can be got into the minds of the German people, not as a bribe but as a conviction, the better chance there is of ending the war and of establishing a better order.

Alongside the abandonment of war as an instrument of policy, another established German tradition will have to be got rid of—namely, that promises and assurances are only to be regarded as binding so long as they continue to be convenient.

It is nonsense to imagine that sixty million people or more in the middle of Europe, accustomed to speaking the same language, can be kept perpetually in a state of subjection, or in separate groups, if they try to associate. The problem is not only to fashion a condition of things in which no group of people can organize themselves for war on others, but coincidently to develop a system of society in which that sort of madness, even if possible, would not be worth while because it is a greater interest to work together peaceably.

All this, or even a substantial part of it, will take time, a long time. It is for that reason that the suggestion of an International Reconstruction Commission with adequate powers, is so valuable. There must be no repetition of Versailles or of a Peace Treaty which, once made, will leave the nations free as before, to go on their own independent ways. So far as Germany is concerned there does not appear to be any body of

responsible persons with whom a treaty could be negotiated whose writ would run in Germany itself.

There must be an authority, backed with adequate powers, free to develop the new system over a term of years as experience directs.

One conspicuous example of the need for a long-term authority obtrudes itself at the start. Millions of young Germans have been forbidden to be taught the facts of history. All young men who were at school at any time during the past eight years have had the Nazi version of things drilled into them, and millions of children have never known anything else except so far as their parents have dared to convey other impressions. Libraries have been purged and re-purged and the same apparently applies to the members of the teaching profession. How far this process has succeeded with the Church it is difficult to say, but we are confronted by the prodigious task of re-educating a whole people and gradually moulding their point of view to humane and tolerant standards, to respect for the pledged word and for undoubted historical truth. In that alone there is work for a generation; and the work during that time will be without hope unless an inspiring and better system is being developed at the same time.

The broadsheet, rightly I think, takes it for granted that the Reconstruction Commission will be supported by adequate military or air power and that there must be an international control of the materials and machinery necessary for reconstruction as well as for war making. Apart from the cost of maintenance of the occupying or controlling forces and of the Commission itself and its machinery, there will have to be a re-victualling of nearly the whole of Europe and credits, in one form or another, for the re-establishment of industry. In addition, if the worst desolated countries are to have a fair chance and real hope of resurrection, there must be a sufficient measure of direction and control. Presumably direction and control will be the business of the Reconstruction Commission, but where is the money or credit to come from to finance these prodigious operations, and in what form?

The broadsheet rightly rules out "reparations in the old sense." It is certain that if the damages inflicted were all added up on any basis of present values, the total would be so astronomical in dimensions as to be meaningless in terms of any existing realities. We cannot conceive that restoration, on the basis of a large part of the world condemned to bankruptcy as debtors who can never pay, is possible at all. In this

connection the broadsheet contains a sentence with which, as a solitary exception, I find myself in complete disagreement. It suggests that a certain part of the reparations would be paid by Germany by the gratuitous export of machinery and equipment. Any scheme on that basis would, I am sure, be quite unacceptable to the chief receiving nations and at the most would represent only an insignificant contribution to the total.

We have, I think, to visualize a new form of international currency and credit altogether. There would surely have to be an international issue on a single basis of value to cover all costs. It is difficult to see how the work of restoration could be done at all except on such a basis. I know that Lord Perry, and other eminent and disinterested business men, have given much thought to this subject; and the authors of *Planning* could render no greater service than to consider this vital problem in more detail with their characteristic wideminded-ness and vision.

There cannot be "freedom from want" in desolated Europe unless the credit of all is made available for the help of all. One can imagine that nations may carry on within their own boundaries with separate currencies applicable to their internal transactions, but the need for world restoration will, I believe, compel the introduction of a uniform currency system for international trade and lead to emancipation from the existing jumble.

In conclusion, the Atlantic Charter and the partnership of Russia in the war establish the necessity for leadership in promoting the new International Order being provided by Britain, the United States, and Russia, with, I hope, China.

It is likely that history will come to judge as one of the greatest of Mr. Churchill's declarations, that bold broadcast on the Sunday night when Germany attacked Russia, in which he unflinchingly pledged our aid and welcomed Russia as an ally in the fight. It must have given a cold shiver to many a Colonel Blimp, but it was a great declaration—a very great declaration. It recognized, as the world must recognize, that nations can have their different systems and yet work loyally together in matters that affect the well-being of all people.

# HITLER'S "PAX GERMANICA"

By Peter F. Drucker

HAVE the Nazis any plan to govern the Continent of Europe which they so confidently expected to master permanently? What is the "New Order" which is mentioned in every dispatch from Berlin, and which the Nazi spokesmen set against the "decadent Pluto-democracies"? How can the Germans who know better than any other people the explosive force of national feeling in Europe, expect to keep twenty major nations and countless minor national groups in Continental Europe in permanent subjugation? Or do the rulers of Germany have no plans beyond smash-and-grab conquests?

Actually, the Nazis do have plans for the permanent establishment of their rule on the European Continent. Even before Hitler's victories in the West, Nazi theorists and newspapermen had been discussing Nazi Europe and had been working on a scheme which would allow Hitler and his Party to reap in a future peace the fruits of their victories in war. With the fall of France, the problem of the maintenance of Germany's Continental supremacy became the main issue of the German peace plans. Now, after two years of intense discussion in German newspapers and books, these plans seem to have progressed beyond the laboratory stage; and during the last months the first large-scale practical experiments have been begun in the conquered countries.

To be satisfactory from the Nazi point of view, such plans for the future organization of Europe must assure permanent German superiority on the Continent in a manner which would give the Germans all the advantages and all the economic and political benefits of a "Master Race." Historically, such an attempt has always been based upon the disarmament of the defeated countries; and every such attempt in the history of mankind has eventually failed because the vanquished found means and ways to rearm. The Nazis too propose to keep the conquered nations permanently disarmed. But they intend to go much further than any of the previous attempts. They propose to deprive the conquered countries of the very equipment with which modern arms are being produced. No one knows better than the Nazi rulers that under modern con-

ditions armaments are dependent upon a country's industrial capacity, and that modern wars are fought and won at the assembly line in the factories behind the front. Consequently, the starting point in the Nazi blueprint for the future European reorganization is that only Germany will own and operate any of the basic modern industries on which modern armaments are based. Germany will not only have a monopoly on the possession of aeroplanes, tanks and mechanized equipment. Germany is also to be the only country on the Continent to manufacture any steel, to own a chemical industry and chemical research laboratories and to produce modern machines, automobiles and engines. Thereby, the Nazi planners believe that it will be made impossible for the conquered countries ever to rise in armed rebellion against the German yoke.

The main steel making centres of Continental Europe outside of Germany lie in a narrow strip immediately West of the German border which runs from Holland down to North Eastern France. This strip which includes Luxembourg, Europe's most concentrated steel district, is to be settled exclusively by German speaking people. The present inhabitants as far as they are not German by language or race—and most of them are not—have to leave and will be replaced by "racial" Germans loyal to Hitler. The same is to apply to the second non-German steel producing district on the Continent, in Czechoslovakia; it also is situated within a few miles of the German border, and it also is to be "purged" of all non-German elements. The non-German chemical industry as far as it is not situated in the same districts as the steel industry, is to be scrapped as is the French and Belgian automobile industry, the Dutch electrical and machinery industry, or the famous old shipyards of Rotterdam, Antwerp and Brest.

It is equally important from the Nazi point of view to concentrate all plants producing synthetic raw materials well within the German borders. The production of oil from coal, of synthetic rubber and of plastics, as well as the knowledge of these processes will be "for Germans only" in the Nazi New Order. As one German semi-official newspaper put it: "We don't even want the tradition of heavy industry, of mechanical engineering and of chemical research to survive outside of Germany."

To supplement the Nazi monopoly in the basic modern industries, Germany is to have exclusive control of the circulatory and nervous systems of modern economic life; transportation and credit. A European customs union or a Euro-

pean monetary union are definitely not in the Nazi plans; for the conquered nations are to be held in a permanent state of inferiority and subjection which could not be maintained if goods and money should move freely across the Continent. But the railroads, the highways, the shipping and air lines of the entire Continent would be under centralized German control; senior skilled personnel such as yardmasters, captains and pilots would be Germans exclusively, as would be the railroad and highway police. Less tangible but no less effective would be the Nazi control of credit. With the German mark the basis for the European commerce, with the savings and bank deposits of all Europe at the disposal of the central German control authorities, and with insurance companies required to re-insure with a German insurance monopoly, volume and direction of credit operations on the Continent would be absolutely dependent upon the decision and wishes of Berlin.

But the German monopoly in the production of modern machines and modern idustrial raw materials does not appear sufficient to the Nazi planners to ensure the permanency of Nazi rule on the Continent—not even if fortified by the control of credit and transportation. They do not regard German hegemony as secured as long as the Continent of Europe is dependent up overseas supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. Unless Europe is basically self-sufficient, any overseas enemy of Naziism commanding the seas can threaten Germany's Continental Empire In the importance he attaches to the threat of a sea power to Germany's European Empire, Hitler is just as much under the influence of the doctrines of an American naval Captain, Alfred Thayer Mahan, as was the Kaiser before him. It is just fifty years since the then completely unknown Mahan published a book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, in which he showed that sea power has in the last analysis always beaten land power because it can cut the vital supply lines of the land powers. It was this book which led the Kaiser into the naval race with England which was perhaps the most important single cause of the last war. Hitler, himself inland-bred and a stranger to the sea, does not put this trust into a German bid for sea power as did the Kaiser. Instead of trying to make impossible a naval blockade of a German-held Continent, he proposes to make it pointless by eliminating the dependence upon sea-borne traffic. His planners have therefore taken as their second condition for the establishment of a permanent

Nazi-Europe, that the Continent of Europe must be made able to feed itself and to provide all its own industrial raw materials from territories and over supply routes which can be defended by land and air armies.

The Nazi self-sufficiency plan for Europe is probably the most ambitious and the most revolutionary one of their designs, far exceeding anything Napoleon ever dreamed of. For the Nazi propose nothing less than the complete reorganization of the economy of every part of Europe so as to make it supply those foodstuffs and raw materials which it is best fitted to produce and which are most needed by the rest of the Continental economy and by the German industrial machine.

Under the Nazi plan, as it is gradually unfolding, all Europe outside Germany is to be divided into three zones. The first of these would include Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries. Even to-day this territory is Germany's main source of outside supplies; it yields almost all the wheat, oil and copper the German war machine can get at present. Its future rôle in the Nazi European Empire goes far beyond its present importance. The Balkans are scheduled in the Nazi blueprints to continue as a supplier of agricultural commodities and raw materials. But they are also intended to become Europe's main producer of cheap industrial goods for mass consumption.

Almost one hundred million people live in the formerly independent countries of Poland, Slovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. At present about eighty-five of these hundred millions are engaged in agricultural work. Yet there is not enough land in Eastern Europe to support such an agricultural population, especially as much of the soil is of poor quality. Accordingly, individual farms are very small and actually far below a really productive size. In Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, few farms are larger than ten to fifteen acres—which is not only too small for efficient production, but too small to give the farmer and his family any sort of a livelihood. Official sources within these countries themselves have for years said that one-third to one-half of the agricultural population cannot be supported on the land and ought either to migrate or to find employment in industry.

The Nazis base their plan for Eastern Europe on the existence of this surplus labour, amounting probably to as much as thirty millions, and certainly to no less than fifteen millions; the Balkan peasant would make a very cheap labourer, since he is used to a standard of living not much higher than that of the Chinese coolie. He is accustomed to long hours and to a

rigid working discipline. The Nazis hope to be able to use these Balkan peasants as a practically inexhaustible reservoir of unskilled and semi-skilled labour for modern plants turning out cheap textiles, shoes, glass and china, hardware and furniture. That the Balkans do not have a sufficient supply of skilled mechanics or of trained engineers to run these factories themselves appears to the Nazis not as a liability but as an asset. For without such native skilled managers, the Nazi argue, the new industries in the Balkans will remain completely dependent upon German management, German foremen and German engineers.

The Nazi blueprints provide thus for the rapid building of consumption goods industries in the Danube Basin. These countries which at present do not produce sufficient consumption goods to cover even their own extremely modest requirements, are scheduled under the Nazi plan to produce in the not too distant future cheap merchandise for most of the three hundred and fifty million people in Continental Europe. There would be super-modern plants, operating on the assembly-line principle and with the most modern German machines; but the labour would be conscript labour living in company hostels, working twelve hours or more, without unions or collective bargaining and actually forbidden to leave their employment. This plan is not so very different from the scheme Japan realized some ten years ago, when shoddy but cheap Japanese consumption goods suddenly began to flood the world markets. An even closer analogy would be the new Soviet system under which every young man and woman will have to do a few years "labour service." Both examples have been closely studied by German efficiency engineers.

Even more radical is the blueprint for the future economic organization of the Western European countries conquered by Germany: France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark. Before the present war, these countries consisted of two large agricultural areas—one in the North, one in the South—with the highly concentrated industrial districts of Southern Holland, Belgium and Northern France sandwiched in between. On the whole there was a healthy balance between industry and agriculture in this Western European coastal belt. It is this balance which the Nazis intend to change by "liquidating" all but very small local industries in those countries.

The main motive behind this scheme to de-industrialize the Western sector of the European Continent is of course political. As long as there are industries in France, Belgium and Hol-

land, the Western nations can be expected to use them for the production of arms for an uprising against the German conquerors. But the proposal to convert France, Belgium and Holland into purely agricultural countries has also an economic purpose. The great weakness of European agriculture is the shortage of fodder crops which makes impossible the production of sufficient milk, meat, eggs and butter without large-scale feed imports from overseas. There is only one part of Europe where additional fodder crops could be raised in quantity: the Western coastal plains. They have the best soil in Europe and the most equitable climate with warm, snowless winters and cool summers. And they get enough rain to have all the year round pasture and a winter forage crop. The Western countries are therefore well suited to supporting large herds of beef cattle, dairy cows, chicken and pigs. And to them is assigned the task of producing all or most of Europe's needs of high-grade foodstuffs.

But in order to exact the maximum yield from the soil of Belgium and France, all arable land in these Western countries would have to be farmed under a system of highly intensive agriculture which requires a tremendous investment of fertilizer and labour for every inch of the soil, and which uses the methods of truck farming to produce fodder crops such as alfalfa, soya-beans and cereals. The Germans argue that the whole population of Western Europe—sixty million people—would be needed for such intensive agriculture, so that there would be actually no labour available for industry. Certainly, it would appear impossible to achieve the tremendous increase in the output of basic agricultural products which the German plan envisages, without a tremendous increase in farm labour. That under such a system the standard of living would be infinitely lower than it was before the German invasion, goes without saying. But that does not appear an obstacle from the Nazi point of view.

Finally, there remains the Mediterranean zone, the countries like Spain, Turkey or North Africa which are partly lush subtropical plains and partly arid and mountainous deserts. To this part of the future German Empire is assigned the task of producing industrial and agricultural raw materials which are not obtainable on the European Continent proper. The Near East would supply oil, Spain and Morocco contain very large iron ore and copper deposits, Tunisia has phosphates, and Turkey has chromium, nickel, molybdenum and antimony. With proper irrigation all these countries can produce cotton.

Actually, Egypt is already one of the world's largest cotton producers, and North Africa, Turkey and Spain have experimented with cotton on a substantial scale and with considerable success. Silk has been produced in large quantities in the Mediterranean for many centuries. The optimists among the Nazi economists believe that the North African and Syrian deserts contain tremendous unexploited mineral resources which only wait for the magic touch of the Nazi geologists. Those prophets are fond of pointing out the great geological similarity between such countries as Turkey and Syria and the American South West with its tremendous production of oil, copper, lead and silver. But even if only actually known resources are taken into account, the Mediterranean region could be made into an enormous source of supply for almost all the important raw materials which are not found in the temperate zone, and which can not as yet be replaced by synthetic substitutes. Even coffee can be grown in North Africa in large quantities, and in excellent quality; and Palestine has within the last twenty years become a leading producer and exporter of citrus fruit.

Some of the Nazi planners profess to hope that such a reorganization of the European economy would actually make it possible for Germany to win over a large part of the population of the conquered countries to the German rule. They argue that each of these zones into which they propose to divide Europe, will be dependent upon the others, and will be unable to keep its economy going without complete dependence upon German help. Western Europe—once it is "integrated" in the New Order of the European Continent—would need the East for its supply of consumer goods, and Germany for its agricultural machinery, fertilizer and automobiles. The Balkans could not operate their new light industries without German-made machinery, German-made steel and the raw materials from the Mediterranean zone. Each of these zones would thus be dependent upon the smooth working of an integrated European economy for its basic supplies as well as for its markets, so that large groups in each zone could be expected to acquire a vested interest in the new Nazi *status quo*—once the Germans have succeeded in smashing the elements of the old pre-Nazi *status quo*.

But even if the peoples of Europe would not be willing to "co-operate" with the Nazi economy, economic realities should, according to the planners, force them to knuckle under Nazi rule, whether they want it or not.

That these Nazi plans for the reorganization of the Continent have hardly received any attention is not due to any secretiveness on the part of the Nazi writers. On the contrary, Marshal Goering's newspaper and the publications of the more radical groups within the Nazi Party have featured these plans for quite some time. But these schemes seemed too wild and revolutionary even to a world which has learned to take seriously the most fantastic claims in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. For once, the technical difficulties in the way of the proposed complete re-making of the Continent's economy appeared too great ever to be overcome. Granting that the goal of a self-sufficient Europe could ultimately be realized, the years of suffering which would intervene, the mass-unemployment of all the millions of workers in the industrial West who could hardly be re-trained for farming, the large-scale dislocation of economic life—all this seemed to make impossible any such scheme as that of the radical Nazi theorists.

It was not only the foreign observer who dismissed these plans as mere theories. The German business man seemed to share this opinion. Those few German newspapers which still are permitted to represent what may be called the "conservative view" have hammered incessantly against the radical plans as dangerous, impractical, unsound and starry-eyed—of course within the very narrow limits allowed to public discussion by Dr. Goebbel's Propaganda Ministry. More important, German industrialists have shown by their actions that they do not put much faith in those great revolutionary schemes and expect the post-war Europe not to differ too much in its economic set-up from pre-war Europe. At least the German industry has shown a singular lack of enthusiasm for the new industrial projects worked out by German government economists for Hungary, Slovakia or some other part of the Danube Basin. They have much preferred to acquire by hook and crook Dutch or French industrial enterprises which, according to the blueprints, are going to be wrecked and should therefore be completely worthless. Even Marshal Goering, officially the patron of the radical blueprinters, has joined in the grabbing of choice French industries; the huge sprawling industrial combine which is controlled and directed by Goering is said to have taken over a large slice of the French chemical industry and to be negotiating for the control of the Schneider-Creusot works, France's great armaments plant.

Yet it is hardly permissible any longer to turn down the blueprints of the radical Nazi theorists as so much pipe-dream-

ing. The actual developments in Nazi-conquered Europe during the last months are such as to compel very serious consideration of these blueprints. For with the exception of those measures which are in the tradition of military occupation, every single one of the steps taken so far by the Nazis in the conquered countries has followed the blueprints of the theoreticians as faithfully as a builder follows a master-plan. And although the Nazis have on their own testimony hardly begun to exercise control over the economy of Europe, the first changes undertaken so far will, unless undone again, do more to alter the economic life of the European Continent than did all the changes and innovations of Versailles taken together.

The *New York Times*, a few weeks ago, printed a short item on one of its back pages, according to which the German government has formed a life-insurance company which would handle all re-insurance business on the Continent. It is doubtful whether many readers realized the importance of this report; it marked the first attempt to establish a German monopoly over the European capital markets. In Europe, more so even than in the United States, insurance companies are the largest accumulators of capital; a few years ago it was estimated that more than sixty per cent. of all savings in Germany were in the form of life insurance. It has been usual for European life insurance companies for many years to re-insure up to fifty per cent. of this risk with another insurance company; and the re-insurance company which took fifty per cent. of that risk, obtained, of course, fifty per cent. of the premiums paid and accumulated fifty per cent. of the capital reserves. Before this war, the re-insurance business on the Continent was equitably distributed between English, French, German, Italian, Swiss, Dutch and Swedish companies; it had remained a truly international business, free from political fetters, even after Hitler's rise to power. Now all this business has been concentrated in the hands of the German government. By establishing a re-insurance monopoly, the Nazis have got hold with one stroke of one-quarter to one-third of all European savings, to be invested in German government bonds and to be used for Nazi political purposes.

It is reported that the Nazis plan to obtain a similar control of all savings in banks and savings banks—by a measure as effective, yet as technical and incomprehensible to the man in the street, as the re-insurance monopoly. According to this plan all banks and savings banks on the European Continent will be required to keep from thirty to forty per cent. of all

their deposits with an "international" central bank to be established in Berlin. The ostensible purpose of this bank would be, of course, the protection of depositors against bank failures. Actually, it would give the Germans direct control over bank deposits and savings, and would allow them to invest these whichever way they want.

The most effective of these Nazi controls has so far been that of transportation. That an army of occupation has full control over railroads, highways and canals is in accordance with military usage. But the Nazis have been using this control of transportation to obtain control of the key industries in the occupied countries. The Germans, for instance, want to buy "legally" the shares of a French automobile factory. They hand the owner an ultimatum: either he sells his plant at the German price, or he will not get any freight cars to bring in his raw materials, nor any petrol for the trucks which carry off the finished cars. If the owner still refuses to sell his business, his means of transportation are cut off; of course, within a few days the plant has to close down, and the Germans "in the interest of the unemployed workers" move in and appoint a "Commissar" who does their bidding. This technique has been used particularly in Norway, Holland and in Eastern France.

Control of transportation and control of credit are indirect. The workers, the owners of life insurance policies and the depositors in a bank do not see it and could hardly understand how it works. For all their direct contacts are, as before with a foreman, banker and insurance agent of their own nationality who in turn see only a native personnel manager, bank president and insurance manager. Other German measures are, however, all the more direct. They seem to express that part of the Nazi blueprints for the organization of Germany's Continental Empire which calls for a German monopoly in basic industries, the de-industrialization of the West, and the transfer of consumer goods industries to the East.

The most important of these changes have so far occurred in occupied France and Belgium. According to the Nazi blueprints, only Germans by race should live in the steel-producing districts of Europe. It is therefore hardly a coincidence that the French-speaking inhabitants of the French, Belgian and Luxembourg steel districts have been driven out, and have been replaced by Germans. The American press has carried the stories of the French exiles from the steel districts of the Lorraine; similar "evacuations" of the native population

have been going on in the Belgian steel district around Liége, the Dutch steel district in the Province of Limburg, and in parts of Luxembourg. At the same time the Czech workmen in the great Czech steel centre of Pilsen have either been sent into the interior of Bohemia or recruited into labour battalions for work inside Germany. To-day, according to German semi-official figures, fifty per cent. of the workers of the famous Skoda works are Germans, whereas three years ago almost the entire labour force was Czech. The same has been going on in the Vitkovice steel works—called the "Bethlehem of Europe"—with its very large and modern plant for armour plate and structural steel. And in Polish Upper Silesia the native workmen in the steel and chemical works have also been largely sent into Germany to work on farms and on the roads, while Germans have taken their place. That strip of fifty miles width around the old borders of Germany within which most of the heavy industry of the non-German countries of Europe is concentrated, is still largely non-German in population. But at least a beginning has been made to replace the French, Dutch, Belgian, Polish and Czech natives in this border district by Germans loyal to the Nazi régime.

Perhaps it is even more important that the Nazis have actually started transferring one of the oldest industries in Western Europe to new locations in the Danube Basin; according to an official German report, a considerable part of the machines of the textile industry in Northern France and Southern Belgium has been sent to new plants built in Slovakia and Hungary which are to be manned by native unskilled labour under the supervision of German foremen. How much of this industry which traces its ancestry back to the twelfth century, and which has been the cradle of European industry in general, and been demolished, has not been published. But reports from Hungary seem to indicate that the transferred machines were the most modern and most efficient ones. And what textile equipment has been left in France and Belgium stands idle—partly from lack of cotton and wool, partly because of physical destruction; but partly also because the German authorities do not allow it to re-open.

This activity has so far been confined to plants in Western Europe producing goods which are not immediately needed for the German war machine. While the cotton and woollen industries of Northern France have been closed down, the silk industry of Lyons in the South of France is kept busy turning out parachute silk for the German air force. And while it is

reliably reported that most of the machinery of the great Phillipps electrical works in Holland which used to produce some of the finest electrical bulbs, radios, vacuum cleaners and other electrical appliances in the world, have been shipped to Germany, the leading Belgian manufacturer of photographic equipment is kept busy making films—both for the German soldiers and for German aerial photography.

At the same time German geologists have been reported in French North Africa, especially in Tunisia with its valuable phosphate and copper deposits, and in Morocco whose iron mines have long been a German objective. Under German guidance and partly financed by Germany, new fodder crops are being tried out in the Balkans and in France. Germany's leading chemical producer, the I.G. Dye Trust, has financed experimental planting of soya beans in Rumania, Bulgaria and, according to recent reports, in occupied France and Holland. Cotton production in the South of Hungary, in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, again under German guidance and with German capital, is well past the experimental stage. And the Germans have sent some of their best agricultural specialists into Algeria to try out cotton and tobacco production there.

All over Europe Germans are busy with economic and industrial changes which fit in only too well with the master blueprints discussed in the Nazi press. Can Europe be made self-sufficient? And can the Nazi plan work? Looking at it purely from the point of view of economic technique, the answer would be "yes" rather than "no." It is certain that a planned regimented European economy based upon a complete regional division of labour and a watertight divorce from the markets of the outside world would give to non-German Europeans a lower standard of living than they had previously. Even if the Nazis did not have it as their announced policy to reduce the conquered peoples to a subsistence level, the economic upheaval necessary to realize the Nazi plan could not but have the most disastrous effect upon the standard of living and the efficiency of economic production. Even after the readjustment has been effected Europe could not return to a free market economy in which the consumer has the freedom to buy for his money what he wants. But economically, a regimented and planned self-sufficient European economy is entirely possible; and with modern methods of mass production it may not even take a very long time to create it, especially if the human sacrifice necessary for its realization is not taken into account.

# THE WRITER'S DUTY

By Storm Jameson

THE 17th International Congress of the P.E.N. has just been held—in London. The last, the 16th, took place in June, 1938, in Prague. Europe was already moving towards war. For a few days, a city in which the 17th century was still living showed the writers of more than a score of nations the European civilization of the 20th at its fine point, living, between crises, with courage and gaiety. There was one evening—it was June 27—when they saw *Romeo and Juliet* acted, with incomparable freshness and vigour, in the garden room of a 17th century palace. The host that evening was Dr. Franke, Minister for Education in the Government of President Benes. The other day I learned that in December, 1939, Dr. Franke died at the hands of the Nazis. Make what you like of those two dates. But make no mistake. The road into the past is closed. Any writer who tries to escape along it will find himself in a graveyard—and not one of those we know where the dead are tranquil and satisfied.

The London Congress—with writers of over twenty nations: this includes Americans who arrived by air—spent three days discussing the responsibilities of the writer. There is some evidence that the first writer was Cain. It rests on the fact that writers have a noticeably uneasy conscience. In any time of crisis—whether it is the prolonged crisis of social disintegration, or the acute crisis of war—writers begin to justify themselves for taking no notice of it. "Am I my brother's keeper?" they say—and some decide that they are. Usually by that time it is too late: their brother is past hope. A certain German professor had never heard of Hitler until a Nazi official marched into his room and handed him a document to sign. He signed it and returned to his problem. This is either the model for devout intellects or the model for irresponsibility. The writer must decide whether his work justifies him in ignoring a crisis which may lead to millions of deaths—including the deaths of colleagues he does not like. And including the death by torture of the Czech Minister of

Education who had the idea of playing *Romeo and Juliet* in a room built during Shakespeare's lifetime.

I shall not enquire why a writer should reproach himself for wanting to be indifferent to the death of society. A stockbroker need not. Possibly the organ of sympathy is overdeveloped in a writer and rudimentary in a stockbroker. I am not a natural historian.

We are living, possibly at the end of the period we entered at the Renaissance. During this time we—this includes stockbrokers as well as writers—have become very responsive to the idea that we have natural rights. The right to life, the right to struggle for liberty, the right to pursue happiness. We have become suspicious of talk of duties. The word, we feel, hides a whip, a reactionary, a banker. It does not surprise us that Marshal Pétain makes full use of it. But is it partly our fault that the idea has become infect? If we had known who was going to find and misuse it, should we have left it lying about empty?

I believe that we have natural duties. The first and last of these is our duty to honour—not any national State only because it is the State we were born into—but the material and immaterial values we have decided are worth paying for. When the State is honouring the demands of these same values, it will be our duty to honour and help the State. We have agreed that in this war the values—resting on a Greek, Roman, and Christian base—of western civilization, are in danger. We might remember that they have been in danger for a long time—for several centuries. Their obvious enemy is national sovereignty, from its respectable beginnings to its present disreputable career among demagogues turned dictators and newspaper proprietors turned demagogues. If that were all, we could be easy. We should know what to do. But, in fact, we are right to suspect a subtler enemy at work.

For the moment, let us leave that. We have to decide whether we are taking part in what is, or could be, a true social revolution. I think we are, and we shall succeed exactly so far as we know what is going on and can direct it intelligently. The real struggle in this war is between two forces, one of which is still partly unconscious, and weakened by being unconscious. The Nazi force is as sure of itself as a bomb. It hopes to achieve a totalitarian sovereignty, based in theory on the idea of a naturally sovereign race and in practice on a sovereign military caste. Its real opponent is not our determination to preserve what we have. We have a great many

things we do not want to preserve—the dole, the outrageous wastage of child life. The force that really opposes the Nazis is, if we knew it, the need, the only half-conscious impulse, of western civilization to renew itself. This renewal must be based in theory on the idea of a sovereign reason, a law which is above nationalism. And in practice on a use of modern knowledge and skill to secure us common people in our natural rights, while fitting us, by education, by giving us a vision, to carry out our natural duties. This and this only would be a social revolution. This, and this only, would be victory.

Has the writer a specific responsibility? If he has, what is it? In war he has the responsibility of any citizen to try to save what he values, by means at hand. In this war, the chance, only the chance, of renewing western civilization depends on the victory of England and her allies. If he is needed as a soldier he has no right, for the sake of preserving his special skill, to run away. In a war, the first guardian of our values is the armed man, and the web of workers by hand and brain who support him. These knot the line that has been cut and give us a chance to re-sew it.

Writers who are free to act as writers can apply themselves to the task—so complex that it alarms all but the stupid and frivolous—of renewing life after the war. The problem, on one level only, concerns the method of renewing Europe. This involves the problem of Germany. Books are being written to prove—usually out of German mouths, which is too easy—that the Germans are only fit to be deleted. No one has had the courage yet to suggest that the crime of deleting them—all of them, since the crime would be useless if one were left alive to begin over again—should be carried out by this generation. But need we alternate between hating and pitying the Germans? Wouldn't it be more useful to decide that obedience and devotion to an idea are German necessities? They allow themselves to be tortured to death for an idea—in concentration camps where the torturers are also Germans. They invade, pillage, murder, for an idea and because they were told to. Is it impossible to turn this energy and devotion to a civilized future? If it is, then the future is impossible.

Ought we not, too, to be preparing our people to realize what the defeat of Germany involves—not for economists, diplomats, generals, but for every obscure man, every woman and child? Anything like the moral collapse after the last war—the idiot rejoicings, the ignorance, the shortsighted greed, the apathy—would ruin us. But do people realize that the sur-

render of the Nazi generals and politicians will not be the end of the war, but only the end of its first phase? Do they realize that vast numbers of the men and women in the forces will have to stay there for another two years? Do they realize that it will be many months before a responsible and strong German government emerges from the Nazi ruins? Do they realize that just because the Nazis have been demobilized the English will not be? Unless people have been prepared for what is certainly going to be asked of them *after* the war, their will and courage will fail when it is put to them. The war after the war will be lost. Europe will be lost. And England will be lost. Is this, or is it not, a challenge to writers especially?

We have learned certain lessons. Have they been well learned? A nation, like a class at school, is kept back by its lazy members and its duffers. We know now that what passed for realism in the twenties and thirties was a combination of hard lying, fear, and greed. Isolation has been bombed out of all except brains where it forms part of the bony growth. But England, with her odd forty-five millions, cannot police the continent, and if we could we would not. It would bore us to death before it exhausted us. Our knowledge of ourselves, and the lessons of the last twenty years, equally push us to realize that a Security Police is needed and that we can only provide part of it. If that were all . . . but it is only one phase of European reconstruction. And reconstruction itself can only be based on a system of world control of raw materials and lines of communication. And we cannot even begin this monstrous task until we and our allies—this includes Russia—have agreed with each other on the terms of the post-war settlement, and secured the co-operation of the United States.

In 1919 the men responsible for making the peace started off several young nations into the future. Not enough people realized that a team of sovereign national States is not the only possible or natural or the most vital political order in Europe. That in fact it ran counter to the hope of a peace based on reason. We committed another crime when we turned our back on these young athletes, and left them—with a resentful and brutalized Germany—to run into trouble.

The writer has no duty, unless he is a soldier or an expert, to offer to do point-duty in Europe or to draw up scientific plans. He has a double duty. To remind the gentlemen who direct Reconstruction Commissions that the unit of value in the world is not a mile of frontier territory, or a dollar, or even a bushel of wheat, but a single human being, the most obscure, the least

outspoken. The value of an economic system corresponds exactly to the opportunity it gives every child to become a healthy, tranquil, and responsible citizen of his country. A German child needs the same chance, no more, than a Czech, a Polish, a Norwegian child. A world order which does not make its weakest member wish, freely, to defend it with his life is a fraud.

The writer's other duty—I refer to English writers now: I am not competent to point out their particular duty to the others—is to persuade the English that they are responsible to Europe, and cannot evade their responsibility out of indifference or modesty. The responsibility is to the future of every child. This includes every English child. Only a fool would try to minimize the immense difficulties of creating a new European order. Only Englishmen who are ignorant, or who are tired and discouraged, will refuse to make the effort. Here we touch the root of the problem. A disillusioned and mistrustful people will refuse, passively or actively. It is an old root. It has been growing in us for a very long time. Unless we realize that scepticism and despair are latent in us with the other microbes, of influenza or unemployment, we cannot judge of our chances of escaping a worse disaster than the war. It is not only the middleaged who are tempted to give way to despair. It is the young as well. Question any young man or woman with whom you have a more than casual friendship. And it is not only the inactive. It was a young airman who gave me the best definition of the despair lying in wait for his generation. He said: "I dislike the idea of bombing so much that *I* must do it. If our society needs these brutal things done, it's more decent to do them than to think of other people doing them."

Press hard enough on any artery of life in our time and in our language, and—between the pulses of courage and blind hunger—you will catch this under-beat of disillusion. It would not be true to pretend that war and the threat of war are responsible. They help. Men and women need security for their children, if not for themselves. They need it bitterly. When they cannot hope for it, they begin, as they have done already, to refuse the burden of children. It is not only war they are afraid of. It is poverty, the dole line, the slow life-long wastage of instinct, intelligence, hope.

But by themselves poverty and insecurity do not, or need not, issue in despair. A man who believed firmly in the future—if it were only the future of his great grandchildren—would see

to it that his family did not die out so long as he had a crust to put in their mouths and a day between him and his death. How else did the Polish nation, the Czech nation, survive? But once a man is certain of his daily bread, he begins asking: Is that all there is? And when he becomes convinced that all he lives for is to eat to keep alive, he loses interest in anything beyond saving his life. Very soon it scarcely seems worth the trouble to pass on this life of an animal which thinks in order to eat and eats in order to think—since it is a trouble, and we have to make sacrifices for children.

A very stubborn man, with more than his share of intelligence and vitality—I am describing Mr. H. G. Wells—might deny that a growing number of his contemporaries—this includes at least three generations who have had to run to keep up with him—were sceptical about the worth of their lives until the war provided them with a reason for dying. He would be wrong. I call the characteristic literature of the twenties and thirties in evidence. *The Waste Land* gives the note of the twenties. In the thirties a poetry of personal salvation blew up—strongly enough to blow some English writers as far out of their course as Hollywood. Each of us had only his personal recipe for living—travel, speed, a crusade, a mania for first editions—or simply habit. It is easy to make a habit of living. The habit did not save us—whether we were writers or stockbrokers, Mr. T. S. Eliot or Sweeney, or Mr. Eliot in the rôle of Sweeney. To be only comfortable and safe after this war would not save us. We shall still ask: Why was I born? And if it is the State which promises to make us comfortable, we ought to mistrust the offer. *Nowt for nowt* is the rule in this world. The price asked may be our freedom to ask questions.

The believing Christian says that man ceased to be sure of the worth of his life when he began to doubt his immortality. If you accept this, you know what to do. If you don't accept it, you must find another way of convincing yourself that it matters, enormously, what you do with your life. To be modest about it is treacherous. Dignity, the dignity of all human beings, depends on your belief that you exist to serve something more valuable than your little life. See what even a corrupt belief can do. The faith of young Nazis is corrupt and real. We shall destroy it by defeat, and if the future has nothing to fill its place, young Englishmen will follow young Germans into a mortal disillusion. We try to explain the collapse of France by saying that many Frenchmen—peasants as well as bankers and journalists—were too anxious to save

the material things of their civilization, their churches and vineyards as well as their homes and money. Do we forget how long it took us, us, the English, to realize what we were losing by surrender? Nothing we could touch. Nothing we could count. Our confidence in the past, and our chance to renew the future. Nothing less.

To believe in himself, a human being needs a double assurance. First, he must be sure that everything will be lost unless he is kind, loyal, brave. Everything. If the State looks on him as only a hand or an adding machine, he will soon think of himself as a hand. If he is naturally docile he will hold it out to be filled. He will grab with it if he is not docile. This is the final reason for distrusting the tyranny, even the benevolent tyranny, of the State, even the World State, and for insisting on the maximum of decentralization and regional life. The life itself of the human race, its will to go on living, depends on the sense of responsibility in every obscure person. It does not depend on a free ration of bread and a wireless set in every home. These material things are finally immaterial.

Writers will be treacherous if they do not insist on the value of values. The real existence of possibilities in human life which are worth saving at any cost. At any cost. Obscure men and celebrated writers are each worth what they can save, no more and no less. This should make them feel humble and responsible at the same time, which is just. It puts them in their proper human relation to the universe.

Second, a human being wants to be sure that he is immortal. It is intolerable that an elm-tree or a tortoise should live longer than he does. It is intolerable that his gestures, as a philosopher or a baker of good bread, should be blotted out. You can't, you say, promise him personal immortality. All the more reason for promising him that, if he takes the trouble to have children, they will have the chance of decent lives, dignified by responsibilities as real as his own.

These promises can be made by the writer—not in so many words, but by the passion of his belief in the future of his family, his own or his brother's, his race of English or French, the race of men. Why should he suppose, if he has not been born with this belief, that he is a species of human animal which is absolved from giving birth to it? To put it brutally, the writer is not born to express *himself*. His egoism is worthless unless it embraces the egoisms of other people. He has no knowledge of reality if the only reality he knows is that of his own sufferings and pleasures. The more likenesses he sees

when he looks at himself—the likenesses of other people, of rivers, or insects—the more he can give out of his vitality, his confidence in living, his impulse towards what is living, his pleasure in the future. He was born for this. The humble and great men who make up the past of his family and his nation formed him. He owes to the future anything he got from them and anything he can add to it. If—having exploited all his own feelings—he has nothing to bequeath the future except his disillusion and dryness, he is a defaulter. He can excuse himself by saying that the symbols he received from the past had become meaningless, images standing in the desert. He is partly responsible for the desert. Didn't he fail to lead another meaning through it?

Can we say that a writer has a duty to believe that freedom, courage, and justice are worth more than individual lives, and that money and luxury are relatively worthless? It will be fatal for him to preach, or join a party. Heaven forbid. But he could cease, at least, to lay all the blame on society for its idiotic disorder—which, he says, forces him to write in such a fashion that he avoids the disgrace of being understood by the idiots. Society is composed of writers as well as bankers and newspaper proprietors. The writer can take the bitter trouble to find hard ground under the decay and stand on it to write . . . I put the question and leave it. Have we, in our proper anxiety to keep our right to criticize, in our absorption in ourselves, our unconscious images and all that, have we bungled our unique task—our task of aiding men, conscious as they are of their short lives, to endure immortality? . . .

# PLANNING POST-WAR EUROPE

## III. Economic Re-Settlement

*Prepared in co-operation with the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments by J. EMLYN WILLIAMS*

POLISH and Czechoslovak circles in London are giving much serious thought to the problem of the economic reconstruction of Central and East Europe not only as it concerns themselves, but also in its relation to general reconstruction of the Continent and the problem of peace.

In the statements which follow they indicate quite clearly that better understanding must depend upon a more progressive economic system in the world through a re-organization of international trade based upon international planning.

The Polish standpoint is that industrialization is essential to raise the standard of living in Poland and that there must be an emancipation of East and Central Europe from German economic domination.

The Czechoslovaks, after emphasizing the immediate post-war needs for foodstuffs and raw materials for the purpose of reconstruction, condemn as false the commonly held view that Central and Balkan Europe are an economic hinterland of Germany. Further, they lay down that free trade (as commonly understood) is as dead as economic autarchy or the absolute political sovereignty of any state.

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**Poland**

The economic and political resettlement of Europe is closely bound up with the future of the Eastern and Central European countries lying between Germany, Italy and Russia. The economic structures of these countries will have to be readjusted, in order to raise the general living standards of their populations and increase their share in world trade.

The Polish viewpoint on this subject can be summed up as follows:

1. The countries of Eastern and Central Europe, situated between the Baltic, the Black and Aegean Seas, are destined to play an important part as a subsidiary highway for Britain and the U.S.A. to the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East. They offer a wide field for exploitation—waterways, railways, electrification, etc. The consolidation of Poland's position on the Baltic will open up new possibilities for maritime traffic to the landlocked countries of Central Europe.

2. The aforesaid countries are "backward," because their production which, for a long time, had to serve the interests of foreign Powers, is still mainly based on agriculture which, in view of the density and considerable natural increase of their populations, can neither offer profitable employment to all their inhabitants, nor safeguard a level of consumption per head of the population in any way approaching that of the agricultural countries of the Western hemisphere. This applies in particular to Poland, where too large a percentage, over 60%, of the population is compelled to make a living from agriculture, so that a considerable section of this population is partially unemployed. Consequently the Polish internal market for manufactured goods is restricted, and, in 1937, Poland's share in international trade amounted to only 0.9%, as against 13.7% for the United Kingdom, 8.6% for Germany, 5% for France, 3.4% for Belgium, etc. These evils could not be remedied, even if agricultural production were to be brought to a far higher level than at present. The only permanent solution to this problem is the *industrialization* of these countries, and this process would be facilitated by the fact that the areas in question abound in certain raw materials such as coal, iron, ore, zinc, copper, bauxite, salt, potassium salts, timber, etc.

3. When assigning to each country the economic rôle it will have to fulfil in a resettled Europe, the old distinction between "industrial" and "agricultural" countries will have to be abandoned. Each Eastern-Central European country will be free to develop its agriculture in order to satisfy the needs of its own population, but, at the same time, it should, within the limits of a larger co-ordinated plan, be able to build up those industries which are best adapted to its natural resources. This will result in raising the living standards and increasing the consumption capacity of the peoples concerned, thus promoting trade and contributing to a further rise of industrial production on an international scale. This system will militate against policies aiming at forming self-contained national units

or "watertight-compartments" like those pursued by European countries before the war.

A further advantage of this system is that agricultural surpluses will be absorbed by the respective countries themselves, instead of competing in world markets with the agricultural exports of the Western hemisphere.

4. International trade will have to be reorganized to enable all countries to import the raw materials they need and to pay for these imports by the export of their own manufactured goods. Credit and investment policies should be closely linked with this interchange of commodities and help to facilitate the export of additional goods to the debtor countries, whilst facilities should be provided to the latter to export additional quantities of their own products to the creditor countries. This system, by stimulating international trade, should tend to make currency restrictions superfluous.

5. Experience has shown that commercial intercourse always expands between areas which have attained an equally high economic level. The industrialization of Eastern and Central Europe will therefore correspond to the interests of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the U.S.A. This part of Europe will, in the first stage, become an ample market for all kinds of machinery, technical equipment and raw materials, and in the second stage, when the peoples concerned have attained a higher living standard, will become capable of absorbing increasing quantities of articles destined for consumption, imported from England and America, as well as colonial goods.

6. The formation of regional *blocs* of inter-allied nations after the war should facilitate the development of the above system of international trade through the organization of an international economic co-operation, based on far more extensive economic units than those into which Eastern and Central Europe has been hitherto divided. This should serve as an effective check to the excessive economic nationalism and sectionalization which characterized the pre-war period.

7. The emancipation of Eastern and Central Europe from subservience to German economic interests will put an end to Germany's self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and a number of essential raw-materials in regard to which this area now forms a supplementary source of supply for Greater Germany. The *Reich* will have to import these commodities from overseas and

be subjected to the control of Britain and the U.S.A. in this respect.

8. In connection with the disarmament of Germany it will be necessary to suppress all her munitions factories and to limit her production of machinery and chemicals. By way of compensation for damages inflicted by Germany an appropriate part of her war industries, shipping and rolling stock should be transferred to Poland and other countries. German property in these countries, both public and private, should be handed over to the respective States and the owners compensated by the *Reich*.

As regards international aid for reconstruction-purposes, countries which have remained undeveloped owing to economic exploitation by foreign Powers and have been the most devastated during the present war, should be accorded special priority, similar to that granted to Belgium after the last war.

9. The *laisser faire* policy of the 19th century was based on three fundamental elements: Free migration of labour, unrestricted movements of capital and free trade. To-day, for obvious reasons, these factors have ceased to operate. To re-establish an appropriate balance of trade and payments between the Anglo-American world and the Eastern-Central European *bloc* new methods must be adopted. A solution could probably be found in a system of international planning devised to direct the flow of goods, credits and investments, so as to produce an economic equilibrium, and avoid a repetition of pre-war suicidal experiments in the form of self-contained economic units. Russia, owing to the vastness of her area and her natural resources, is the only country where such a system of closed economy is partially possible. It would, however, be a great mistake to include the countries of Eastern and Central Europe in this self-contained system, thus cutting them off from international trade to the detriment of Western markets.

10. The system of international planning must also include the question of tariffs. These are indispensable in cases of major differences in cost of production. The tariff system, however, should not assume prohibitive proportions; on the contrary, with the growth of more intimate trade relations between friendly States a system of preferential tariffs will, perhaps, be found to be the most practical solution.

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**Czecho-slovakia**

When the war is over Czechoslovakia will be faced with economic tasks of two kinds, those of an immediate, and those of a more fundamental nature. The immediate task confronting her will be to get hold of at least the most necessary foodstuffs in order to feed the population during the first few months, and a sufficient quantity of raw materials to get industrial production started again.

Czechoslovakia is a territory, which has been economically exploited by Germany, since the Munich Agreement. Nearly 40% of its economic resources were torn away from the Republic by that dictated peace, and the political and economic interests of the remaining parts of Czechoslovakia were subordinated to those of the *Reich*. On March 15, 1939, Czechoslovakia became virtually a German colony, exploited by the brutal methods so characteristic of the first phase of German colonial policy. On the second anniversary of the occupation of Prague, Czechoslovak authorities in London compiled a balance sheet of the two years of German economic management of Czechoslovakia. They found, after a critical survey of the facts, that one third of the national wealth of the country had been stolen in that short period. Hence it is easy to imagine what will be the position at the end of the war. Czechoslovakia is already suffering from hunger, her harvests and her cattle have been taken to Germany, her industry has been ruined by being forced to adapt itself to the military requirements of the *Reich*, and there is a deficiency of essential raw materials. At the end of the war she will be an economic desert it is feared. To feed the population during the first period, until the economic life of the country is put in order, to supply raw materials, and, if necessary even finished articles to a country, which will have been robbed of everything before the Germans are driven out, to import machines until new machines can be produced at home, to import medical supplies —these are the ends for which plans are even now being made.

As regards more fundamental economic problems, it will be possible to attempt their solution in detail only after the war, and in accordance with the economic and political condition of Europe after the defeat of Germany. From the standpoint of general principles, the Czechoslovak Government is in full agreement with the economic clauses of the Atlantic Charter. It favours the principle that all nations shall have equal access to raw materials. It does not desire that even its present enemies should be permanently confined to a low economic

standard. It believes that the final re-organization of Europe will be easier if no country will have reason to feel economically dissatisfied.

Czechoslovaks are convinced that economic autarchy will be defeated in this war as definitely as political dictatorship, since the two are inter-related. A state which deliberately isolates itself economically from other countries is bound to have sinister political designs, and to disturb that normal circulation of goods, which pre-supposes the co-operation of all countries and all nations. On the other hand, they do not believe that the defeat of economic self-sufficiency will amount to a return of Free Trade, as they knew it before the war.

The period of Free Trade, which so greatly contributed to the wealth of the world—or, more accurately, of some of its parts,—is to-day ended as definitely as the principle of the absolute political sovereignty of every state. The world must emerge from this war in a much more ordered state than was the case up to 1939. In all probability we shall enter on a period of planned economy on a world-wide scale, when the consumption and production of every state will be adapted to the production and consumption of the whole world. So Czechoslovaks do not desire a return to that anarchy, which led to periodic economic crises, of which the last one—the slump of ten years ago—was largely responsible for the world's present troubles.

As in politics, so in economics, neighbour states may have more interests in common, and may have to cultivate closer economic relations than states which are geographically separated. The Czechoslovak Government would like however to refute a mistaken view so often heard when the economic re-organization of Europe is considered. German propaganda has spread the belief that the states of Central Europe and the Balkans are merely a kind of hinterland of German economic life, and that they will have to remain in the sphere of German economic influence even after the war. Only in this way, it is said, will it be possible to maintain peace in central and south-east Europe. It should be realized, however, that the states of Central Europe never were Germany's economic hinterland. In 1937 imports from Germany to Czechoslovakia amounted to 13.7% of the total, while exports amounted to 15.5%. For Hungary, the respective percentages were 19.6% and 28.9%: for Yugoslavia these figures were 21.7% and 32.4% respectively. Bulgaria alone became economically dependent on Germany with 43.1% and 54.8%

respectively. In this case political causes were responsible, and in any case that country represents but a small fraction of the whole European economic territory. There is the additional fact that Central and South-Eastern Europe did not play any important part in German economic life, until German economics were dominated by political and strategic considerations. In 1929, the year of maximum economic prosperity in that part of Europe, Germany imported from the Balkans goods to the value of £22,000,000 and exported goods to the value of £26,000,000 a relatively small figure. During that same year, the trade of Czechoslovakia and Austria with the Balkans was more than that of Germany. Central Europe is not an economic complement of Germany. It would, therefore, be contrary to the real needs and tendencies of economic life in Central and Southern Europe, if these countries were forced to form some kind of economic union with Germany. It would be an artificial union, and a repetition of what happened after the world war. Democracy would again win the war, and lose the peace, for a united Central Europe under German leadership would be nothing less than a victory of Hitlerism even without Hitler.

The Treaty of Versailles created a Central Europe, capable of thriving, both politically and economically. Austria and Hungary were faced with certain difficulties during the period of transition; but with the help of the League of Nations they succeeded in overcoming these difficulties, and in adapting themselves to the new conditions. In this connection it may perhaps be pointed out that on that occasion, Czechoslovakia fulfilled her duty as a member of the League, and as a neighbour. Czechoslovakia, having inherited two-thirds of the industrial production, and only one-fourth of the consumers of the old monarchy on the Danube, had her difficulties also, until she found new markets, and learnt to take an independent part in world trade. In the end Czechoslovakia too attained great prosperity.

These Central European states would be able to develop their own economic existence to even better advantage, if some international organization were established to arrange for a rational interchange of goods. It is not accurate to blame the so-called Balkanization of Central Europe for the economic crisis, which unsettled the continent in the '30's, and facilitated that economic penetration of the Germans to the South, which preceded the political and military drive. The economic crisis of Central Europe was merely a part of the crisis of the world.

A closer collaboration between these states of middle and small size would be very useful economically as well as politically. But how far this collaboration can go, it is difficult to foresee. It would be very deplorable if such incidents as the Customs War between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which proved to be expensive for both countries, were repeated. Since it is believed that a certain amount of jointly planned economy on an international scale will be possible after the war, such economic conflicts should be a thing of the past. These Central European neighbour states are in a position to plan and to conduct their economic relations in greater detail than is possible on an international scale. The Czechoslovaks have political relations with the Poles, and are planning a close co-operation with them in the economic field also. But, in the realm of economics as well as in that of politics, this "close association" between the two countries is meant to be the nucleus of a larger unit, in which, other states of Central Europe, with the exception of Germany, will be included. Plans for the future can only be considered in detail, when the political problems of Central Europe are clarified. The problem of a common Central European currency, about which some people are already racking their brains appears to us to be premature. For the moment the question of all questions is that of winning the war.

To sum up, it may be said: Czechoslovakia is ready to participate in the organization of the post-war world, and especially of the smaller territory of Central Europe to which it belongs, geographically and politically. In both politics and economics she is willing to renounce as much of her sovereignty as other states are prepared to renounce. Czechoslovakia is convinced that a common plan of world production and consumption is not only useful, but also necessary. She does not desire the economic destruction of Germany, nor does she desire to be part of Germany's economic living space. Czechoslovakia demands access to raw materials under the same conditions as will be granted to other states, and for the immediate post-war period she claims such supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials as will enable her to revive her economic life, which has been almost completely exhausted by the Nazi occupation.

# THE POLES AND THEIR PROMISED LAND

By Robert Machray

WHEN some 150 years ago Poland vanished from the map as completely as she again disappeared during the last two years patriotic Poles kept alive their hope of her restoration by telling each other and all others with undefeated conviction then and later, "Poland is not dead so long as we live." Just as we say with a favourite poet, "There will always be an England," those Poles said there will always be a Poland. Then, realization: for rather more than twenty years Poland was again prominent on the map—to disappear, nevertheless, once more. With a stronger conviction than ever the Poles now tell each other the same thing their forefathers said after the Three Partitions; they maintain Poland is not dead, but awaits restoration, and expects it at no far off date. What, however, is this Poland? Is there an essential Poland? A Poland of the head or of the heart? There certainly is a promised land in the distance, though its frontiers are but mistily discerned, even by the eye of faith. On the other hand, Frank, the German Governor General at Warsaw, the capital of the area Hitler at first attempted, all in vain, to make into a vassal Polish country on the Czech model, declared a few days ago, "Poland as a State has gone for ever." To give the devil his due, Frank is doing his German loathsome level best to make that statement come true by every kind of infamy that can be perpetrated on defenceless human beings.

It has been widely remarked that whereas one of the famous Fourteen Points of President Wilson was given over entirely to Poland and her rights, nothing similar is found in the Eight Points issuing from the Churchill Roosevelt meeting and signed on August 12. It is a grave defect in that Anglo American Declaration. We are cursed or blessed—there is ground for both of these points of view—with a much truncated Press, but so favourable, generally speaking, to the Government that it is small wonder it is regarded abroad as controlled both in news and views. For the most part it extolled the Eight Points as a marvellous achievement inspired by the highest

political wisdom, though even a little reflection at the moment showed it was nothing of the sort, but rather an instance of exaggerated wishful thinking. It contains what must be characterized as a good deal of grandiloquent, platitudinous nonsense—the stuff so dear to politicians in all lands and not less so in our own. It is largely impractical and, besides, is self-contradictory in parts. How on earth are its clauses three and six, for example, to be reconciled in actual working? The former postulates the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and the latter denies this right to Germans who prefer to be Nazis—and the vast bulk of the German people are Nazis, with Naziism as their chosen way of life wrought into the very marrow of their bones. Further, how are clauses two and three to be equated with the stubborn facts of the immense German settlements in Polish territories? Clause two, it may be remembered, desired (*sic*) to see no territorial changes in disaccord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, while clause three wished (*sic*) to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. How is it to be done?

This question is so germane to my whole subject that I interpolate here at some length the facts in the case, based on an article, in that well-informed periodical *Free Europe*, in its issue of September 5, by Jozef Winiewicz, former editor of the *Dziennik Poznanski*—suppressed and defunct, of course, like every other genuinely Polish newspaper in Poland. So soon as Hitler had worked his wicked will on that unfortunate country he started its Germanization, the simple plan followed with ruthless determination being the expulsion of the Poles and the settlement of Germans in their place—in accordance be it said, with German tradition, for forced mass migrations of like kind were not new. In the days of Frederick the Great, as well as in those of Bismarck, this process went on quite needless of the misery of the Poles affected—"if we Germans," wrote Bismarck, "are to maintain our position in the East, we must root out and get rid of the Poles." Under Himmler, today the Gestapo chief, who was appointed commissioner for the consolidation of German nationals in October, 1939, the expulsion of the Poles and the German colonization of their lands have proceeded apace from that time to the present and very thoroughly, for it is the Gestapo and the police that handle —manhandle is a better word—the wretched Poles, drive them out of their property, and confiscate all they possess except the

barest necessities. In England we first heard of these horrible deeds in connection with the Baltic arrangements of Hitler when forwarding quite openly Stalin's forced occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Up to the end of last year upwards of 130,000 Germans were transferred to Polish lands from these Baltic States. Nearly 190,000 Germans, or German sympathizers, were likewise transferred from Rumania, the big majority coming from Bessarabia and the Bukovina. From the Tyrol arrived the largest number—206,000, while from parts of Poland then occupied by the Soviet or the Warsaw area over 160,000 Germans were transferred, a grand total of about 700,000 Germans in occupation of Polish territories and doubtless making the most of the opportunity to dig themselves in.

To the question, what is to be done with them, there is or can be no easy, ready answer in accordance with the humanitarian sentiments that are supposed to be the ultimate basis of the Eight Points as indicated superlatively in the eighth point itself. It is rather absurd for Mr. Eden (who, since the Prime Minister urged Mr. Hore-Belisha to be a little humble because of his shortcomings, might himself be a little less authoritarian because of his recent costly failure in the so called Middle East) to assert, as he did at Coventry on August 30, that

> the principles upon which the post-war world will be based have been laid down in the eight-point declaration issued by President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister on the occasion of their historic meeting. This declaration is the charter of all free nations. It establishes principles which will be equally valid for all nations, both great and small. It excludes all idea of hegemony or zones of leadership, whether in the East or in the West.

The last sentence is supposed to be a hit at the famous editorial of *The Times* of August 1, which said in very plain terms that leadership in Eastern Europe, meaning thereby the States from the Baltic to the Black Sea, belonged either to Germany or Russia and therefore, as Germany was excluded by the Allies, it fell to the U.S.S.R. A well-known Polish writer, Mr. Z. Grabowski, dealt faithfully with this *Times* article in the September number of THE FORTNIGHTLY, and it calls for no further comment from me, except that personally I am always rather glad to see the veteran "Thunderer" strike a line of its own (even it I dissent from it) particularly in opposition to the Government of the day, thus showing its independence, a genuinely valuable asset in the view of all unprejudiced students of contemporary events, and manifesting above all

that it is not, as so many foreigners persistently but erroneously believe, the organ of H.M's. Government.

Our Foreign Secretary then went on to speak of the Agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union, and the joint declaration by the British and Russian Governments to Turkey; and he made out that Poland and Turkey held a special relationship to England. "We have treaties of mutual assistance with both," said Mr. Eden. "Poland is our gallant ally on the battlefield. In virtue of their geographical position and their own national qualities Poland and Turkey will both be called on to play an important rôle in international affairs after the war." It may be questioned whether the Poles are keen to be put on the same footing as the Turks, who up to this writing have greatly benefited from the large loans—in all about seventy millions sterling—they have received from us, without anything like a corresponding return on their part. But what is to be noted, so far as the Poles are concerned, is that there is no indication, even of the vaguest nature, in Mr. Eden's remarks of what is covered by the term Poland, no frontiers, near or far, being set for the Poles to their promised land, to say nothing of that expansion, such as the taking over of East Prussia from the Germans, which so many of them look forward to with confident hope and eager longing, but which also involves incredible forced migrations.

Six days before Mr. Eden spoke Mr. Churchill in a broadcast to the world, nearly a fortnight after his meeting with the American President, had nothing more definite to say to the Poles than this:

> Poles, the heroism of your people standing up to cruel oppressors, the courage of your soldiers, sailors and airmen shall not be forgotten. Your country shall live again and resume its rightful part in the new organization of Europe.

Similar comfortable words were addressed by the Prime Minister to the Norwegians, Czechs, the Free French, the Dutch, Belgians, Luxemburgers, Yugoslavs and Greeks, in a highly rhetorical outburst. Questions of frontiers arise or will arise in the case of some of these nations after the war, but it may be doubted whether any will be as difficult as those of Poland, yet none are so important for the peace of Europe. In his review in Parliament of the progress of the War Mr. Churchill on September 9, when referring to the Declaration, seized on its one and only really vital statement, "after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny," in clause six, and, as it were, held it aloft as meaning everything, but he went on to deprecate questions

being asked as to what was implied by this point and that, and the stressing and the straining of the interpretation of this passage or that. The House listened, but not too enthusiastically, the truth being that the country was rather disappointed, as M.P's. know quite well, with the expressed result of the meeting of the two statesmen, since what had been hoped, if not exactly expected, was an announcement of the entry of the United States into the war on the British side at an early date. However splendidly staged and manned, and cleverly aided by mystery, suspense, and other advertisement, the meeting has indeed had something of the nature of a *coup de théâtre*, with almost a *coup manqué* for ending. At all events nothing significant came out to comfort the Poles and other allies regarding frontiers.

But it may be retorted that I am forgetting the Polish-Soviet Agreement. For the immediate phase of the war and probably for some time to come England and her allies were and are extraordinarily fortunate as regards Russia—let that be said at once. That Hitler should attack the Soviet Union, whose other name is Stalin, was the greatest surprise to practically everybody, seeing that it was generally understood from what had gone before in the shape of her conveying large supplies for Germany that Russia would not oppose him; that Stalin did oppose him at once, and with a measure of success no one had expected, was the greatest surprise of all. The Russians have been and are putting up a magnificent resistance. It is they who are now bearing the brunt of the war, and as they have been compelled to retreat long distances over a front of upwards of 1,500 miles their losses in men and material must be literally enormous—men, it may be said, do not matter so much where there is such an abundance of them, but material, which has to be made in vast quantities and without delay is a very different thing, and the lack of it is deadly—only our moat made by the silver sea kept us from finding this out last year. It is on making good these heavy losses that our Government and that of the United States are concentrating their efforts, though we were told, and it is still true, that production here at home was and is far from reaching the peak and that the Americans were and are "short," as some of them phrased it, on their own defence. As the times and the crisis of the moment are, it surely is fair enough that the Russians should be supported, though the tide of big battle may ebb from that front and roll in much nearer our own shores. The provisional Polish Government, with its seat in London, is any-

how backing the Soviet, though such action cannot be very palatable to a large number of Poles. The Polish-Soviet Agreement was signed at our Foreign Office on July 30, and Mr. Eden was largely responsible for it. What was supposed to make it acceptable to the Poles was the first clause of the treaty which stated that the Soviet Government recognized the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity, the meaning assigned to this curious string of words being that the Soviet renounced its conquests made in September, 1939—acts of aggression as wicked as any in history—and nothing was said about compensation.

After the Agreement was signed a Note was put in by Mr. Eden which said that our Government did not propose to recognize any territorial changes which occurred during the war unless they did so with the free consent and good will of the parties interested. What was in his mind was, of course, the statement of the Prime Minister in Parliament on September, 5, 1940—which is well worth quoting in full, as it is most important:

> We have not at any time adopted, since this war broke out, the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognize any territorial changes which took place during the war, unless they took place with the free consent and good will of the parties concerned.

A Conservative member asked the Foreign Secretary whether it could be assumed that as a result of the agreement no guarantee of frontiers in Eastern Europe will be undertaken by the Government, and the reply was that nothing done by the Government in this connection involved any guarantee of frontiers, an assertion which brought up the irrepressible Mr. Mander who inquired: "On the question of the guaranteeing of frontiers, surely the existing guarantee to Poland holds good?" But only to be told by Mr. Eden: "There is, as I have said, no guarantee of frontiers," which is tantamount to saying that the determination of the new Polish frontiers is left over until the end of the war.

Naturally the Soviet Government is officially not at all frank as to what it takes the Foreign Secretary's statement to mean, but its newspaper *Izvestia* made no bones about it. After stating that the Soviet recognized that the Soviet-German agreement of 1939 had lost its validity concerning territorial changes it emphasized that territorial changes are not eternal

and that frontiers established by such changes are not immutable. It declared, for instance,

> we do not consider immutable the Polish-Soviet frontiers established by the Treaty of Riga in 1921, nor do we share the view that 'no one dares to presume that the borders of the Polish State of 1939 may be questioned,' as Sikorski expressed it in his speech. It is no accident that the British Government refused to guarantee the Polish frontiers as they existed in 1939 before the outbreak of war between Germany and Poland. The problem of the Soviet-Polish frontiers is a matter for the future.

The speech of General Sikorski, the Prime Minister of the provisional Polish Government, referred to in the foregoing quotation, was delivered on July 31 in London, and the outspoken comments of the Soviet journal on it could have given him little satisfaction. Just as Churchill had gone all out on June 22 for the British alliance with the Soviet so had Sikorski almost immediately done the same for an agreement with it. As became known later, he did not carry all the members of his Cabinet with him in this or when it came to the making of the Agreement with the Soviet; all concurred in the making of some agreement with Russia, but August Zaleski, his cool, prudent and much-experienced Foreign Minister, and two other Ministers, dissented from the terms of the actual final instrument, as they deemed it much too vague, too indeterminate in its wording. The Soviet, whose conduct in the very recent past to the Poles could not be altogether forgotten, was not adequately bound down in their opinion. Mr. Zaleski is understood to have pointed out that it was open to the Soviet Government to destroy the whole or at least the main force of the Agreement respecting territorial changes by declaring that it had held the Polish territories it had occupied by virtue of the overwhelming demand of the proletariat of these regions voting in regular assembly, and not by force, or by any other reason, whether international, diplomatic or not. Such a move on the part of the Soviet cannot be considered impossible, but rather to be expected more especially when taken in account with its thoroughly egoistic policy of the last two years.

There are many in England and elsewhere who will say and still more who will think that the Ethiopian does not change his skin; among the currents of the time is the resurgence, at present in a mild form, of the Panslav idea under the aegis of Soviet Russia, but when did Russia at any time exploit that idea except for her own advantage and expansion? However these things may be, the Polish Government in London by a

majority accepted the lead of our Government, making what it considered was the best bargain it could in the circumstances which, it must be admitted, were not free from difficulty, and anyhow setting free a million and a half Poles held as prisoners of war or political prisoners in various far away districts of Russia. A Polish army, said to be 300,000 strong potentially, is being organized on Soviet territory to fight alongside the Russian armies against the Germans. Up to the moment of their release these men were about as badly treated by the Soviet as any in the world—how very mixed must their feelings now be! They will still be in the clutch of the Soviet and entry into their promised land must appear to them at best highly problematical. But first they will have to be fed, for all were on the verge of starvation, and clothed, for all were in rags, without boots and nearly naked. Is it our Government that will have to do this? I am not by any means trying to minimize the Polish accession to the Soviet strength, but merely bringing to light the facts, to help to reduce that dreadful complacency which besets our people from time to time for inadequate reasons, and is hard at work again because of the tremendous fighting power exhibited by the Russian soldier in the present stage of the struggle in Russia. And what if the dread day come when the Soviet no longer bulks as a huge asset on the side of the Allies but has to be regarded as a heavy liability? It is a possibility, and there is no use in denying it.

Nothing in its way was more remarkable than the attitude taken by so many of our papers to Poland after the entry of the Soviet into the war, the alliance made with it by our Government, and the supplementary Polish-Soviet Agreement. There seemed a sort of feeling of great relief that Poland had been taken off our hands, and this was very noticeable in the Liberal Press, which has always had a perfectly inexplicable tenderness for the Soviet. Take a typical instance. "The real value (of the Polish-Soviet Agreement) to Britain," says *Truth*, in a recent number, "is that it enables us with a clear conscience to wash our hands of the Russo-Polish problem. We are pledged to restore Poland, so that, without this latest development, we should have been obliged, after beating Germany, to wrest the remaining Polish provinces from our Russian allies . . . Our original pledge was given to Beck and Smygly-Rydz (*sic*), and honour is satisfied when we are released from it by Sikorski and Raczkiewitz (*sic*). Relief may justly be felt at the removal of a danger which threatened

to entangle us in still further intervention on the Continent." The misspelling of the Polish proper names is significant of the fundamental ignorance of the writer of that paragraph of the real state of affairs between us and Poland. We came into the war because we gave a guarantee to Poland, and nothing has occurred to free us from the obligation. The value of the action of the Soviet has been indicated in the quotation given before from the leading Soviet Government paper, and no doubt that paper expresses the real heart and soul of Stalin in this matter. Are we going to try to whittle down our pledge by saying we are pledged to *a* Poland but not to the Poland which existed at the beginning of September two years ago? It simply won't do. Our honour is involved with Poland, and is not involved to an equal extent or in quite the same way with the Soviet. The mere bigness of the latter makes no difference as regards our being committed in honour to Poland.

It should be added, to conclude, that Poland has a great political position from her geography as lying between Germany and Russia, and that it is a vital British interest that her geographical position be widened, strengthened and made as effective as possible between the two great territorial Powers. Further, she may rightly be regarded as the leader, in the limited sense at any rate of her size, of the series of countries stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and now being called in some quarters the United States of Central Europe, definitely contemplated as a counterpoise after the war to both Germany and Russia and coming under the general direction of England. Isolationism concerning the Continent of Europe should not again, after our bitter experiences in the war, be a feature of British national policy. And as that is the truth, and any *entente cordiale* with France seems very remote, ought we not to encourage this group of States, not one of them a first-class Power but in the aggregate extremely powerful, as our representative in continental Europe? Of course the relationships of the various States would have to be worked out in considerable detail, but the combination is a possible and even probable one, and it is for us to give it all the help, political and economic, that it undoubtedly will need. When the war is over things will be terribly difficult, but this appears to be the best course marked out for them and us; first of all, however, we shall have to get clearer ideas of the pivotal importance of Poland and her promised land.

# IN THE LAND IS OUR HEALTH

By C. Henry Warren

THERE is at last a growing conviction that one of the root causes of the present disaster is the modern attitude to the land. Of course, there was a similar conviction during the last war, but it did not go deep enough and it did not last long enough. Promises made to British farmers, under the stress of panic in the last war, were forsworn as soon as the war was over. The farmers have not forgotten this: little wonder, therefore, if they raise a more than sceptical eyebrow to-day when they hear the same promises being made from high places. They suppose that these promises also will melt like butter under the sunshine of peace.

But I believe their scepticism, though pardonable, is this time ill-founded. There are many differences between this war and the last—and not the least of these differences is the fact that the public is twenty years older in disillusionment. Its whole attitude to the present war, whatever newspapers and propagandists would have us believe, is one of intolerance that such things should be allowed to come to pass. It accepts the necessity for the war, now that the war has been forced upon us; but it continues firm in its conviction that, given a wiser administration in the recent past, the war need never have happened. This general disgust has persisted through two years of bombing and blockading, and will persist till the war is over. Not unnaturally, therefore, even the most casual and irresponsible members of the public are asking how and why we have all been pushed into this tragic muddle. It is memorable how, during the first months of the war, an attempt was made to stifle all talk of "war-aims." The attempt, however, was never really successful: it was, in fact, so unsuccessful that to-day talk of war-aims is very nearly the only kind of war-talk that kindles any real enthusiasm.

I think, therefore, that our sceptical farmers are for once unjustified in their scepticism. When it is proclaimed that never again shall farming be allowed to slip back into the old bankrupt disrepute, this is no empty promise made as a result

of pinched bellies. It is part of the general conviction, amounting almost to a passion, that no future government will be allowed to get away with such a slack and unimaginative land-policy as has emanated from Whitehall these last twenty years. Black as the present is, therefore, and unbearable as the resulting mismanagement from Whitehall may be, the British farmer should take heart: his day is coming at last

Several factors, over and above the pinched belly, are conspiring to force the coming of this happier day; and not the least important of them is what might be termed the general awakening, even among the most urbanized members of the community, of a land-consciousness. The bombing of our cities has driven thousands into the country; and even where this evacuation has been accompanied by general dissatisfaction, an awareness has slowly developed among the evacuees of what the land means—the life on it, the arduous and skilful labour on it, and the indebtedness of all society to those underpaid and overworked men and women who serve it from cradle to grave. All this is of first-class importance. It means that the younger generation will no longer be ignorant in such matters, but will have gained an actual sense of contact with the land which they will never lose again, even if and when they should return to the towns. And it means that those pioneers who, at this very moment, while the war is still at its height, are lending all their vision to discover the proper reorientation of our country life, will not have such an ignorant and unwilling audience when the time comes to lay their plans, fully matured, before the public.

It is one of the concomitants of the regimentation for total war that everybody gets a taste of the follies (and worse) of bureaucratic government. Not a day goes by but another instance is thrust under our noses of the crass workings of the official mind. It would scarcely have been thought possible, for instance, that two responsible bodies like the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Agriculture could show themselves so remote from the realities of the matters with which they are concerned, and on which our very life depends. Perhaps the Ministry of Agriculture is the worse offender because its errors are, in the end, more far-reaching. It began with a welcome show of commonsense, but the war was not many months old when it fell into the major error of "farming by the book." Notwithstanding the fact that it had mapped out the countryside into areas, each under the direct eye of a War Agricultural Advisory Committee, composed of local men of proved worth

as farmers, it began to impose upon them rules of procedure ordained from a central office where the presiding genius, for all the evidence he gave of a knowledge of elementary husbandry, might have been a chartered accountant or a Master of Arts. The results are too painfully evident to need much attention here. Only recently I received a letter from a woman whose immediate concern (both for itself and as her contribution to the war effort) is the safeguarding of the old Welsh trade of stoneground oatmeal. This, one would have supposed, was an aim that would ensure the strongest encouragement just now; but listen to what actually happened. One of the best millers in Merioneth, she says, has decided not to mill and dry any more oatmeal for human consumption. And the reason? Simply that he is defeated by the sheer crassness of the orders with which he has to comply, and by the daily snowstorm of forms he is required to fill in—forms which are complicated enough for any of us, but which for a miller who thinks in another language are totally incomprehensible. ("They would seem to be," says my correspondent, "a subtle device for transferring all the work into the hands of the big millers" —but surely this is giving Whitehall far too much credit?) As for the procedure ordered by the authorities, it is yet another variation of that same wasteful, unimaginative pooling system whereby an Essex chicken-farmer, for instance, may find himself eating Canadian eggs for breakfast—and probably bad ones at that. The Merioneth farmer, my correspondent goes on, must take his grain to the mill, and, instead of the economical, age-old custom of tolling for it, must sell it to the miller, fill in all the necessary forms for such a transaction, and then, when the miller has milled it, fill in another set of forms if (as will certainly be the case) he wants to buy it back again. Such a system—and it is applied to almost every commodity produced in this country to-day—could only be thought out, one would suppose, in a sealed room in the heart of the metropolis by somebody who has never yet dirtied his boots with the good clay of our countryside.

So the tale could be repeated, *ad nauseam*. The farmers themselves, of course, knew all about the follies of bureaucratic government long ago. They experienced it in the last war. They have been up against it, one way or another, ever since. They are long past showing any surprise, therefore, when it happens all over again in this war, magnified a hundredfold. If cynicism were possible in a body of men so nearly safeguarded against this human weakness by the very nature of

their work and their daily life, farmers might well be cynical to-day. Instead, happily for us, they just get on with their job, and when anybody starts talking about rosier prospects after the war is over, they scarcely even bother to listen. Certainly I for one don't blame them; yet I dare to think that this time they are wrong. The future will be better for them. It must be. We have at last arrived at the stage when there is even no choice in the matter—unless, of course, we decide to forswear our farming heritage altogether, turn the countryside into a dormitory and playground for urban dwellers, and concentrate on supplies from overseas.

But before examining any further the imperative necessity for drastic changes, let us take a glance backward and see how and where all the trouble began. In September of this year there was celebrated the centenary of Arthur Young, first Secretary of the first Board of Agriculture, under the presidency (1793) of Sir John Sinclair. His praises were sung in all the responsible papers. There were even radio talks and feature programmes about him. And certainly he was worthy of honour. His books (and he was a most prolific author) have left us an invaluable documentary picture of rural England in the second half of the eighteenth century. He knew what he was talking about. A man of inexhaustible energy and quick perceptions, he covered every inch of the countryside and wrote it up with precision and vitality. His *The Farmer's Calendar* was to be found in every farmhouse, side by side with the Bible and the *Pilgrim's Progress*. His *Annals of Agriculture*, begun in 1784, spread itself over forty-five volumes (incidentally, it numbered among its contributors King George III, who wrote under the name "Ralph Robinson.") His *Travels in France* gave a picture of the condition of the French provinces on the eve of the Revolution which is of major importance. And his surveys of agriculture as practised in the various regions of the British Isles are the source books to which students have returned ever since. Yes, he certainly merited a fanfare on the occasion of his centenary. But how many of the eulogistic authors who wrote about him remembered that he was also the advocate of Enclosures and, as such, the Villain of the Piece? The theme behind all Arthur Young's books was the improved output that would become possible when Enclosure had turned out the last of the peasant-owners from the land which immemorially had been theirs. Young was the great apostle of the gospel that not until the Open Field system had completely given way to Enclosure would

British husbandry be able to avail itself fully of the inventions and improvements which were coming to the fore everywhere, or would it be able to keep pace with the growing population of these islands. He was, in fact, the vociferous spokesman of that increasingly dominant section of the populace which was to turn this country, during the next hundred years, into Napoleon's "nation of shopkeepers."

And what did this transition involve? Fundamentally, it involved a change-over from farming for subsistence to farming for profit, and hence from serving the land to exploiting it. Whereas, under the Open Field system, a man had grown his own corn in order to feed himself and family, after Enclosure he grew it to sell, so that himself and family might wax fat on the profits. The ultimate sequel to such a transition is the state of affairs under which we are suffering to-day and have been suffering for years: the state of affairs which encourages farmers to burn their crops and fishermen to throw their catch back into the sea: the state of affairs which, in fact, has got to be altered straight away if we are not to be lost entirely.

And there are further implications in this disastrous transition which Young found so alluring and which he wrote so many thousands of words to advocate. In order to keep pace with the growing demands made upon a land continually being exploited for profit, science has come forward with countless mechanical and chemical aids. In other words, instead of using its inventions to serve the land it has concentrated on exploitation, forgetting (if it ever remembered) that, as Lord Lymington says:

> The soil is not a factory that can work three eight-hour shifts in a day at peak production. ***It is a living thing that will only respond to the way in which it is served.***

The result, in these islands, is a soil impoverished to such an extent that nobody can foresee the extent of the consequences, and a recklessness in regard to forcing the land that mortgages the future for generations to come.

All this is now general knowledge. The war has forced even the most confirmed urban-dweller to ask pertinent questions about our land policy. The farmer no longer stands isolated from the rest of the community, a figure of fun to some, and to the rest a conservative old fogey quite undeserving of sympathetic consideration. There is a general agreement, not only that something has gone radically wrong, but that this something has to do with the land policy adopted with increasing complacency in these islands since the last war: a general

acknowledgment, in fact, that the land is the basis of all tr economy, and that until it is so viewed there will only increased suffering for all. Hence the many attempts no being made, even before the war is finished, to fram a saner land policy for the future. Such attempts, it shou be noticed, do not emanate from the Government. Th emanate from private individuals, concerned ideally for t well-being of their country and mankind in general, and fro interested organizations. Whitehall may continue to turn deaf ear even to the best of them, knowing that, at any ra for the moment, it has the last word; but the important fa is that new policies *are* being framed and, what is more, th they are gradually winning the attention of a disturbed publi There is, for instance, the remedy put forward by the Roma Catholics. It seems to me, however, that they spoil their ca by special pleading. A recent booklet by William Vince Baker: *New Maryland—a way to economic freedom by mea of Catholic Land Settlements*, makes this clear. Father Bake writes:

> We maintain that a Catholic 'back to the land' movement would ha an incalculable influence on the conversion of England . . . . In t first place, Englishmen are supposed to be 'practical' and chie interested in a thing in so far as it will 'work.' The sight, therefo of Catholic land-settlements, occupied by happy and prosperous ye men, *succeeding* and really 'working,' would have more influence their ideas of the Catholic religion than any amount of theoretica convincing arguments.

In other words, the Catholic religion is mainly interested framing a new land policy for this country in so far as it m bring converts to the fold. But the land must be served f itself, because it is the basis of the health and wealth of people, irrespective of creed: any other reason seems to b incompatible with lasting beneficial results.

Then there is the programme put forward by Viscount Ast and Mr. B. Seebohm Rowntree in their *British Agriculture: t Principles of Future Policy*. The authors are, in effect, t official spokesmen of Big Business as applied to agricultu Their basic aim is "greater efficiency"; and in pursuance this aim they promulgate a future "less rather than m friendly to smallholders," a system of agriculture which da shall tend to become "more mechanized, more highly capit ized, and more devoted to producing high-quality foodstuffs bulk," and a policy which involves "the amalgamation of far into groups and the planning of their layout on more scient

lines, so as to permit of the more extensive use of machinery." In fact, they wish to carry to its logical conclusion the system embarked upon with the advent of Enclosures and advocated to the top of his bent by Young. Evidently Viscount Astor and Mr. Seebohm Rowntree have not considered what it means to push the small farmer out of business altogether in favour of amalgamated farms controlled from some faraway centre and mechanized up to the hilt. I would like to draw their attention to some words Hasbach wrote:

> Trifles neglected by the large farmer for want of time or because they appear too trivial are the very objects of the small cultivator: he has everything near him and under his eye, makes use of every small advantage, cultivates every corner, does his work himself, has the help of his wife and brings up his children to be 'the most useful people the country produces.' Such men serve the land in the way it must be served, never stinting themselves, and as absorbed in their service as any priest in his religion.

Do Viscount Astor and Mr. Rowntree imagine that the centralized authority of their dream collective farm will show a similar knowledge, a similar zeal? And do they imagine that the workers on such a farm, concerned only with hours and wages, like any factory-hand working on the belt, will tend the land as it must be tended? I am afraid these authors have quite another concern: it is that Big Business, and not the land, shall be served. Elsewhere in their book, when discussing the subject of corn, they give themselves away. They write:

> Wheat can be grown far more cheaply overseas. It is pre-eminently a crop suited to large-scale methods of farming which we cannot hope to attain. It is a commodity which enters largely into our overseas and inter-imperial trade.

There you have it. It does not matter to them that corn-growing is inherent in mixed farming, and that mixed farming is the only possible way of preserving the fertility of the land.

And that word "fertility" brings me to another policy that is being put forward, and the only one which shows any sign of treating the matter with the disinterestedness it deserves. It is the policy particularly advocated by such writers and practitioners as Viscount Lymington, Sir Albert Howard, H. J. Massingham, Lord Northbourne, Rolf Gardiner and Adrian Bell. Reduced to its barest minimum, as I understand it, this policy is chiefly concerned with the restoration and maintenance of fertility and with the return to mixed and small farming. It is realized that fertility must be the first concern of any reform that aims to pull British farming out of the slough

into which it has been allowed to sink: in the long run, the health of the soil *is* the health and only true wealth of the people. The practice of exploitation which has been the careless policy of the last twenty and more years has so reduced the fertility of the soil of these islands that only by forcing it with indiscriminate use of artificials can it now be made to yield on an economical scale. To restore this lost fertility therefore, must be our first concern. The second concern is for a return to mixed farming, which is not only the most suitable method for the greater part of Britain, but which alone will make possible the necessary restoration of fertility. It may well be necessary at first to make judicious use of certain artificials, as, for instance, the application of Basic Slag before ploughing old grass, and the moderate use of potash salts or mixed fertilizers on foot crops; but their purpose, as Mr. Rolf Gardiner has said, must never be to extract yields from the soil "but to increase plant growth with which eventually to restore fertility by feeding stock." Afterwards, if the principles of mixed farming be kept before us, with proper rotation and an undeviating attention to those essentials which our forefathers took for granted, the plough, bullocks, sheep, dung, it should hardly be necessary to use artificials at all. As for the third concern of this new land policy, it is intimately bound up with the other two. Encouragement of the small-scale farmer is rightly considered, one of the first implications of a restoration of fertility and a return to mixed farming, since anything else at once postulates a concentration upon farming for profit.

It will be seen at once that the principal aims of this policy are contrary to anything which would appeal to the big business instincts of such men as Viscount Astor and Mr. Rowntree in fact, they run in exactly the opposite direction and are a direct challenge to those forces which have grown increasingly paramount in this and most other countries during recent years: namely, the industrial, trading and money-lending interests which have made the world the sorry mess it is to-day. They are, therefore, revolutionary in the true sense of the word and for their realization they demand the overthrow of the existing order. For bureaucratic government they would substitute regional government: for the present remote centralized authority they would substitute local authority based on immediate contact. Again to quote Mr. Gardiner:

> Bureaucratic government is a system which runs counter to all the best instincts of the British race. Our strength has always lain in personal responsibility and initiative, and the remarkable success which

has attended this is testified by the reputation of personal English rule in countries overseas. Why this staunch habit of entrusting government to individuals has been denied practice at home is one of the mysteries of recent British history.

Yet our system of government has become so hardened in the bureaucratic matrix that it would seem as if the only way out now is to smash it up altogether. Committees are becoming almost the only form of administration to-day, with the result that personal responsibility is rapidly ceasing to exist; and yet personal responsibility, with its allowances for rhythmic elasticity of action, is the only responsibility to which in the long run the land will respond. That, in fact, is the ultimate reason why I favour this particular new land policy above all others: it acknowledges that the only satisfactory bond between men and the fields is *service*. If the land is not served we must perish. Our work is not, therefore, as certain pioneers would have us suppose, to continue the work of Arthur Young until Enclosures have reached their logical fulfilment and we find ourselves starved in a land out of which the last ounce of virtue has been extracted: it is to unwind the miserable tangle until we have substituted subsistence-farming for farming for profit, service of the land for exploitation of it, and small-scale farming for large. In fact, the thing to remember about Arthur Young, in this year of his centenary, is that he lived to wonder if after all he had been as wise as he supposed. When blindness overtook him, and in place of action he was compelled to fall back upon reflection, he said: "A man will love his country better even for a pig." That was the beginning of wisdom. In this belated confession he summed up the reasons why Enclosure, by divorcing the peasant holder and small farmer from the land, has in the end brought about the present nemesis.

# WAR COMMENTARY

## I. The New Strategic Outlook

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

MR. CHURCHILL has made our status in Iran clear and has answere questions which required elucidation. From a military standpoin it was even more important to know how far our action had estal lished communication with Russia, than the fate of Nazi agents an diplomatic staffs. Mere right of transit of war material across Iran woul not have met the requirements of the situation, and it was manifestly essentia that we should acquire such control of the Caspian-Persian Gulf Railway an of roads as would enable us to develop them to their full carrying capacity India should now be able to supply all the labour, rolling stock and skille supervision needed to supplement local resources, and one can trust that ther will be no delay in starting work.

The occupation of Syria and Iraq went far to secure our defensive positio in the Middle East, but Iran was required to round off the strategic front l establishing communications with Russia. To realize what this means o should compare last war conditions with those now established. Then cor munication could only be maintained through Vladivostock and Manchuri Archangel, during the months it was ice free, and Murmansk. But fro Vladivostock the Trans-Siberian railway had not yet developed carryin capacity approaching its present day standards, and the Murmansk railwa was not completed till Russia had practically exhausted her war effort. Mor over, administrative incompetence and corruption resulted in failure to di tribute much of the material which reached the country. To-day, though tl Trans-Siberian Railway has been developed, the attitude of Japan deni Russia the use of Manchurian ports and the shortest rail route, acro Northern Manchuria, from Vladivostock. The Murmansk Railway, though y also has been developed, is dangerously exposed to attack from Finlan while the German occupation of Norway and Petsamo must undoubted make sea communications with Northern Russia more dangerous than in tl last war. If, therefore, Russia had still to depend on the communications wit the outside world which were available in the last war her situation wou have deteriorated, except in so far as modern aircraft can reach Russia fro America under their own power. The importance of the new doorway in tl south is therefore all the greater. It did not exist in the last war for th Trans-Iranian Railway had not been constructed and Turkey barred the wa in Iraq.

The door is still not yet wide open, for the Iran railway and roads manifestl require development. Sea approaches to the door are, however, safer than i any other region, and the proximity of India as a source of supply and labou reduces demands on shipping to a minimum. Furthermore, immediate a reinforcement of Russia is possible now that there is no intervening neutra territory, and ground communications, even in their present condition, shoul be adequate to secure rapid delivery of spare material for which air transpor might not suffice. It remains only to ensure that supplies will be sent withou

lay to Russia up to the full capacity of communications available, and Mr. urchill has assured us that they will be despatched without delay and with- t cautious concern for our own requirements. We may congratulate our- lves that firm action in Syria, Iraq and Iran has left us without serious tanglements and free to exploit our opportunities.

Turkey can hardly fail to be impressed with the new situation which the tension of our strategic front through Syria, Iraq and Iran and its linking with Russia, has brought about. On that huge extent of front only in bya are we in contact with the enemy which leaves us exceptional strategic erty; the back doors of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf are open and the sea ovides communications to supplement those by land.

As a consequence danger to Turkey would seem to have assumed a new pect. It is improbable, under the new conditions, that Germany will demand, seek to force, a passage for her armies through Turkish territory in order reach Syria and Iraq. For the ground that had been prepared for a further lvance towards Egypt has been swept clean; and the German Army, limited strength by long lines of indifferent communications, would now be con- onted by Allied forces well provided with communications and free to ncentrate at threatened points. Turkey herself relieved of danger on her ussian front would be less likely than ever to permit unopposed passage. long, therefore, as she is deeply engaged in Russia it is hardly conceivable at Germany would undertake any far-reaching campaign through Turkey part of the much talked of pincer attack on Egypt. On the other hand, r war with Russia and its partial lack of success would appear to have made ntrol of the Dardanelles of immediate importance to her. The appearance the remaining powerful ships of the Italian Navy in the Black Sea, under rman control, might produce more important effects then they can in the editerranean. If Turkey refuses to abandon her rights over the Straits attack on her, with the limited objective of securing control of them, would erefore seem to be a possibility; more especially as inducements to Bulgaria take an active part could be offered, and Italy from the Ægean Islands could -operate.

Meanwhile the situation in Russia remains highly critical. It is impossible judge how nearly the German effort is approaching exhaustion, or how long ussia with her reduced sources of material supplies can continue to hold the emy in check. That the Red Army is still far from being beaten is proved its ability still to deliver formidable and successful counter-attacks. Those unter-attacks are, however, definitely defensive in character, and until the rman offensive exhausts itself the situation cannot be considered well in nd. It is, however, reassuring to receive reports from British observers w in Moscow, which testify to the magnificent morale of the Russians and the good condition of the troops and their equipment. In a number of ays these reports go far to confirm claims made by Russian communiqués, hich of course must be suspected of optimism. The most amazing thing that the Germans in the face of such determined and efficient opposition, nd confronted by so many difficulties of supply, should have for so long been ble to maintain continuous violent pressure over wide fronts without as yet owing marked signs of exhaustion. It has became a test of endurance and is possible that the German effort is now being made in a spirit of desper- ion hoping that Russian resistance will crack.

In the Far East Japan still hesitates to commit herself, and must be watching vents in Russia with anxiety even greater than our own. Her hesitation has

enabled us to improve steadily our position at Singapore and in Malay
Further reinforcements of British, Australian and Indian troops have arriv
including air units from Britain, giving evidence of our growing air streng
and control of sea routes; material has come from America, Australia a
Britain to replenish reserves; time and opportunity has been given to tra
troops under unfamiliar conditions of terrain, and airfields have been mult
plied. If Japan intended to strike the favourable moment has passed, and
is increasingly probable that she will not venture to do more than mainta
a threatening attitude which, by compelling us to retain in the East forc
which might be required elsewhere, will indirectly assist her Axis friend
Active intervention in the war, now that Russian territory would furnish
hostile base in proximity to her home islands and Manchuria, would ent
risks for her much greater than that of mere failure to achieve her objec
in the south.

What is the outlook for the approaching winter if, as seems probable, Ge
many fails to achieve decisive success in Russia and Japan remains no
belligerent?

Even should active fighting die down the Russian front will continue
make heavy demands on German resources. The R.A.F. may be trusted
maintain and perhaps intensify their attacks on German productive centre
It is clear therefore that this winter will not, as the last two have done, giv
Germany a respite in which to accumulate reserves and undisturbed mak
preparations for next year's campaigns. Under the circumstances will sh
during the winter again reduce her activities to a minimum, or is it mo
probable that she will embark on winter campaigns in regions where climat
conditions are favourable? Limited operations against Turkey would not b
prohibited by weather, especially as much has been done to improve com
munications over the Balkans and through Bulgaria. In Spain, too, it
reported that under German supervision, work on communications has lon
been in progress. It is the German way to prepare well in advance fo
operations which might be undertaken at a suitable moment, even when th
moment cannot be foreseen. Still, it is only in Africa that winter is th
campaigning season, and we can hardly doubt that Libya at least will be th
scene of active operations whether the initiative is taken by Italy or ourselve
If the risks of the passage across the Mediterranean are not considered to
great German support to Italy may be on a more liberal scale than on previou
occasions. For it may be thought that the greater the intensity of the fight
ing in Africa the less material could be despatched by Britain to Russia
Moreover, support to Italy in Libya would make smaller demands on Germa
resources than a campaign elsewhere mainly conducted by German troops
That we must expect a great intensification of air attack on this country, an
probably of attack on its sea communication, during long winter nights, can
not be doubted. But on the whole previous experience tends to indicat
that Germany's policy will again be to husband the resources she will nee
next summer and will concentrate on repairing the damage her army ha
suffered in Russia. Extensive reliefs of her armies of occupation may b
expected, for the double purpose of retraining them after their somewha
demoralizing duties and of affording rest to troops that have suffered heavil
in Russia.

Whatever policy Germany pursues the winter is likely to be a much les
happy one for her than any she has yet experienced in the war, and neve
before has she been in such need of a respite for recuperation.

## WAR COMMENTARY

### II. America and the War at Sea

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

THE outstanding event at sea of the last month is, needless to say, the action ordered by the President of the United States. The words in which he explained why it is an intrinsic interest of the United States to prevent the establishment of Hitler's desired world domination have, perhaps, a peculiar interest for us of this country since they recapitulate, in almost identical terms, the reasons why the Statesmen of Great Britain considered it essential to the security of their country that Bourbon France of the 18th century should be prevented from acquiring the domination of Europe.

> If the world outside the Americas falls under Axis domination, the shipbuilding facilities which the Axis Powers would then possess in all Europe, in the British Isles and in the Far East, would be much greater than all the shipbuilding facilities and potentialities of all the Americas—not only greater but two or three times greater. Even if the United States threw all its resources into such a situation, seeking to double or even redouble the size of our Navy, the Axis Powers in control of the rest of the world would have the man-power and the physical resources to outbuild us several times over.

In those words the President was repeating almost the very sentences but completely the reasoning which impelled the 18th century statesmen of Britain to intervene in the European struggles of the period. There was no Quixotism in their conduct, not even any particular affection for the shabby continental rulers of the old Empire of the Habsburgs. Enlightened self-interest was the compelling factor. It was idle, they pointed out in answer to those who were opposed to intervention, to sit aside in the comfortable belief that the conquest of Europe would not affect Britain's security, and that she could watch with indifference the absorption of the countries of Europe under the shield of her supreme navy. For that navy would not long remain supreme. Once Bourbon France should have crushed her continental rivals she would no longer need to maintain a great and costly army. She could devote not only all her own resources to the sea but also all those of her subject states in Europe. Possessing the raw materials, the labour and the shipbuilding facilities of all those states she could outbuild Britain at sea. Holding all the ports in Europe would give her the massive advantages of position. She would control the sources of the means of propulsion of the fleet—the Baltic timber, spars, hemp and flax which corresponded to the oil supplies of to-day. In such conditions no efforts which Britain could make would be enough to maintain her sea power on the scale necessary for her survival.

The scene has changed. The stage to-day is a wider one. The world is smaller. It was enough for the British statesman to confine his gaze to Europe. The President's vision has to extend to and embrace the world. But there is no difference in the fundamental reasoning.

Passing from policy to its practical application he said that as attacks in American waters " or waters which could be used for further, greater attacks

on us" would weaken American ability to repel Hitlerism "in waters which we deem necessary to our defence" American vessels and planes will not wait for the enemy to strike. That, he went on to say, means very simply that our patrolling vessels and aeroplanes will protect all merchant ships . . . engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. The words were promptly followed by action. The Secretary of the Navy announced the despatch of American naval forces with succinct orders to capture or destroy by every means at their disposal Axis controlled submarines or surface raiders encountered in those waters.

What are the "defensive waters" of a country? German and Italian propagandists—perhaps naturally enough—pretend to confine them to the territorial waters, and indulge in an orgy of typical abuse of the President for daring to interfere with what they are pleased to call the legitimate blockade of Britain. But such vapourings deceive no one and least of all those very many people in the United States who have an intimate acquaintance with the age long problem of the rights of neutrals in war. The rights of commerce to navigate the oceans are not limited to territorial waters: the "waters which could be used for further attacks" upon the United States stretch as far as shipping sails and to bases which serve the operations of commerce attackers and invasionary armies. By his action the President makes it plain that he denies *in toto* the claims of the Axis powers, under the plea of a pretended but non-existent and undeclared blockade, to sink without warning any merchant ship in any sea from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the Greenland straits to the Red Sea. He denies the right of the Axis to throw aside its obligations in regard to the treatment of merchant shipping; he asserts the principles of international law. "The present Government of Germany has no respect for treaties or for international law; no decent attitude towards neutral nations or human life." These are resounding words, constituting, together with the action he had ordered, a plain declaration of his intention to uphold the law. In effect, though Mr. Roosevelt bases his conduct on the interests of the security of his country, and rejects the idea that she shall wait, as other nations on this continent have waited, until Germany chooses to strike her, he goes further: he puts into practice in the most formidable manner certain principles enunciated by Mr. Elihu Root in 1916, when that statesman said:

> Violations of international law which threaten the peace and order of the community or state must be treated as violations of the rights of all, for the law that has been broken is the law of all; it is their protection as well as the protection of the state immediately attacked. They may be strangers to the controversy between the nations as to what the law requires in the particular controversy, but they cannot be strangers to a dispute as to whether the law which is applicable to the circumstances shall be observed or rejected.

So though the security of the United States against the danger to which an Axis victory would expose it must be the primary and immediate concern of the President, his action serves also and we may surely assume is intended also to serve the great ultimate purpose of preserving the law which, as Lord Bryce once said, "is the one thing that stands between us and primitive savagery." For it is primitive savagery that is now stalking through Europe, checked only for the time by the forces of Britain and Russia.

When the matter is carried into the further sphere of practice two points arise. The President's broadcast spoke of "patrolling" as the measure that is to be adopted. Though patrolling is effective, in comparatively restricted waters, against surface vessels, it is of little avail against submarines and

craft. The only effective form of defence against these craft is one in ıich the weapon employed is one hundred per cent. ready at the very spot acked—the ship herself—either in the shape of guns and depth charges board an escorting vessel in close touch with the merchantman, guns on ard the merchantman herself, or aircraft on board either or both of these ıdy to fly at the enemy at an instant's notice. There is no time to lose, no ne to call up a patrolling friend a mile or ten miles away, The submarine's proach cannot be seen and her presence can only be detected at close range; r attack takes place without warning other than that the detecting device ı give; the time of the aircraft's attack is sometimes measured literally in conds. Therefore the defence must be alongside or on board the merchant- ın, preferably both. While the word "patrolling" may be used to describe e way in which the protection will be arranged, it must be interpreted rrectly. In these conditions of warfare it is no longer a trade route or a cal area that is patrolled but the stretch of water occupied by the convoy roughout its voyage.

For the present it appears that the United States does not propose to arm merchantmen since the supplies of arms are as yet not sufficient to provide ›th the fighting ships and the merchants and they are used with better onomy in the men-of-war. This does not mean that the principle of arming erchantmen in their own defence is regarded as contrary to the law, as those thorities in Germany have at different times ventured to assert. No more ›werful an assertion of the right of arming has been made than that by :nator Henry Cabot Lodge on February 18, 1916, in the course of which he id, after citing opinions of many great lawyers including Chief Justice arshall: "There was never any doubt as to the broad rule that a merchant- an armed for defence did not lose her peaceful character." If, therefore, any later phase of the present struggle arms become available and it is ›nsidered, as we consider, that arming is an effective and desirable practice, e may see the system applied to the shipping of the United States and an- ›her difficulty put in the way of the U boat and the bomber.

The benefit of the leasing of the series of bases from the Caribbean to ewfoundland now makes itself felt in a very practical manner. When the ansfer was made it was a valuable expression of confidence that had its eight in the shaping of opinion. Now it becomes an active factor in the ɛfence of our life-line. The United States has the use of positions their ıvy needs and the burden of the defence and organization of those positions removed from our heavily-weighted shoulders.

Before the momentous declaration of American action affairs at sea had ıaterially improved, as the Prime Minister has told us. The enemy had ɛen forced further from our shores and his activities, it would seem, have ɛen largely transferred to the southern approaches in the regions of the frican coast and the off-lying islands, where, it can hardly be doubted, he is ɛing afforded facilities in the ports of those parts. The losses in the severe ›mbined attacks by submarines and aircraft show that our needs of escort ɛssels and aircraft are still very great in spite of the considerable additions ɛe have made to both types of flotilla craft. The protection which the merican Navy will henceforward afford will not in the smallest degree allow f any slackening in our efforts. Our small craft must be increased in numbers ithout stint or pause. In all probability we shall be exposed to new difficul- es during the forthcoming months when affairs in North Africa flare up with ıe cooler weather in the desert.

# THE GLOBE

By G. Rostrevor Hamilton

Singular and secret globe
Weaving images for robe,
Spinning with gradualness of light
From high noon to jet of night,
Argus-eyed and yet in trance
Drawing for its sustenance
Rays from spirit-regions, whose
Bright embraces round it close;
Such the mind: and glimmers more
With Capes and Indies to explore
Than the wide extremes of Earth
Before the Navigator's birth;
Whose sea venturings, long passed,
Lie in sunken memory glassed
Where the mind's dismissal drowns
Pinnacles of earthly towns,
And the shine of earthly streams
Flows in underground of dreams.

Mind's abyss and Time's abyss;
Argus eyes that nothing miss,
Never-closed recording eyes
Hoarding with remote surprise
Fearful apparitions vast
Through their passive mirrors cast;
Mailed Leviathans that sink
Over the horizon's brink,
Beckoning to last eclipse
Triremes, galleons, battleships;
Huge Behemoths of the prime;
Bred from fire-mist and slime
Saurians, whose ridge and crest
Rear up mountains in the West
For vain suns to founder on,
Crimsoned in oblivion.
None of these, no nightmare shape,
That calm scrutiny escape,
Nor at last, in dwarfish span,
The self-fronting image, Man,
Nor his struggling towers spilt
Ruinous for sand to silt;
Towers that rose, towers that fell,
To wail of voice and toll of bell
Heard no more, that yet ring deep
Smothered in smooth-chambered sleep,
Where the cymbal makes a stir
Less loud than of dulcimer,
And once thunders echo faint
In a lulled astonishment.
Turns and turns the secret globe,
Weaving images for robe;
Ceaseless, those recording eyes
Through unwearied centuries
Interfuse with wink and glow
Of life's waving shadow-show—
Giant form and pigmy form,
Forest-lives that burst and swarm
Fevered—the expanse and wing
Of ideas self-imaging,
And immenser concepts thrown
From wild spirit-worlds unknown.
There, successive through the dance
Mixt of gloom and radiance,
Rise, the shadows of a shade,
Fantasies of things man-made;
Wood and stone and marble there,
Zone on zone, stair on stair,
Temples, palaces of air,
Castles, campaniles, domes,
Urs and Ninevehs and Romes,
Babylons and Londons. These,
Or by swift or slow degrees,
Mime upon the fickle stage
Till death tumble them or age
Crumble, or insulting rise,
Higher to assault the skies,
Uniforms of white façades
Playing ghostly grim charades
That spell out the word Decay,
And the phantoms of to-day
Stripped of honour pass away
To sleep in darker hollows hid
Than monolith or pyramid.

Turns the secret world, and drowns
Pinnacles of earthly towns:
Buried some, as flinty shells
Of sea-creatures through the swells
Sink, and rub the oozy floor;
Some, as when a long-shut door
Opens, and a lamp again
Shivers through the dreaming brain,
Flicker upward. So, when storm
Limns a cowering landscape's form,
Curve of hill and spire of tree
Flare in sharpened tracery,
And gold corn and grazing land
Rigid for a moment stand,
While the colour through them burns
Flame-like in translucent urns.
Over the surface stride and wheel
Vast lank images of steel,
Pylons that in death-dance rally
Skeletons across the valley,
Swift invaders seeking root
Where unquelled humilities shoot,
Where, forgetting lives long slain,
Wounds of Earth are green again.

Falls the dew as fell the dew
When the mammoth-shape was new;
Over mountain, over dale
Swings the tumult of the gale,
As it swung when towers fell
To wail of voice and toll of bell,
Faint lost cataracts of sound
Far off echoing underground.
Still those Argus eyes receive
Flame of dawn and print of eve;
Drought and moisture, heat and cold
Still their sequences unfold;
Mirrored lawn and ploughland still,
Shining glade and shaggy hill,
Year by year resume their dress,
While to fathomless recess—
Stair on stair, zone on zone—
Man-made fantasies of stone
Historied in dream are gone.
Constant are the signs of peace,
Lowing herds and fruits' increase,
Constant are the peaceful stars
High in heaven. Restless Mars,
Often though his circuit drive
Men mad-witted to contrive
Masks more hideous of death,
Does but with a fuming breath
Sully mind's serener glass;
Where through deepening levels pass,
Small as glint of deadly flies
Cruising the sepulchral skies,
Aeroplanes, and in slow ranks
Drilled automata, squat tanks.
They, like vanished monsters drawn
In rock-caves, their likeness spawn
Shadowy-pencilled in the cell
Where Moloch and Astarte dwell,
Doomed idolatries of Hell,
While in mockery of wars
Drop the dews and shine the stars.

Singular and secret globe,
Weaving images for robe,
Argus eyes that still inlay
Day with night and night with day,
Beast in field with man at plough,
Song and toil and wind in bough,
And, in jewelled prospect seen,
Fresh humilities of green,
Brightnesses consigned to lie
Sunk in seas of memory.
Thence—as wintered meadows yearn
For Persephone's return,
Who too long has shed her bloom
Pale in dusky Pluto's room—
On some hoped-for day appear,
Drenched in light uncrinkled clear,
Ivory visions; they, submerged
Long in dream, of grossness purged,
Far more real than common sight
Stand in sharpness of delight,
Ripening to a moment's birth
The memorial fields of Earth,
While, for beauty's sheer excess,
Time, in trance, stays motionless.

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# THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

## EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

MR. CHURCHILL'S discourse when he conveyed to the world over the wireless his view of the Atlantic meeting showed that the spoken word still holds mastery. It is true we cannot get through this medium the full effect of oratory which acts on the eye hardly less han on the ear; but we do get something, and with a practised speaker we et much, of the *vox ipsa*, the voice with its varying inflection, its appeal and its response. In this case the orator has a singular advantage over men accustomed to express themselves only through the spoken word—Mr. Bevin, for instance, r Mr. Morrison. The Prime Minister in his vast activities has been vriter no less than speaker, and no less readable than he is delightful o listen to. Every writer is by his trade used to an audience not collected or an occasion; and so he will enter more generally into the thoughts of . public not visibly present than a speaker, treating the same theme before . crowd, would be likely to do. It was the writer rather than the orator who elt need to deal with a question that has passed through thousands of minds: Iow does Hitler compare with Napoleon? And we were reminded that even mperial France stood for the liberating spirit, not the enslaving. Indeed, even when Napoleon shocked the lovers of liberty most, by his invasion of Switzerland, he proved actually the promoter of Swiss virtues; an old battle-ield of sectarian war became the world's best example of mutual toleration. However, we all know well enough that the danger of to-day is far deadlier; and it is far more felt. A book which I chanced on makes it seem as if, except for the scare of invasion in 1803, England had no sense of danger at all in Napoleon's time

**Hitler and Napoleon**

That book was nothing more authoritative than a novel of political life, called *The Cabinet Minister*—written in 1839 by Mrs. Gore, who is credited with some two hundred volumes—a huge fleet of three-deckers. But she was a well-read and accomplished woman who had seen much of the world, and could quote freely and to the purpose from unhackneyed passages and authors. It is true she had only a child's memory of the period in which she laid her scene; but a girl of eleven (and this was a precociously clever girl) would certainly have remembered such inconveniences as affect life to-day. The one thing which she considered abnormal was that English people could not get out of England. "War had sealed up the avenues of the Continent; all the world was at war. . . . There was nothing stirring save King's Messengers, nothing in progress but trainloads and militia." Yes, but carriages and four were under no restriction; within these islands folk could move as freely as ever; and certainly what she calls "those days of stagnation and care" were not without cheerfulness. Her story has to do with two young cousins, close friends at Eton and Oxford, but one of them commanding twenty thou-

sand a year, the other two hundred. They had been idle and dissipated together, " and in those times, for half the young men about town, life was a drinking bout without end, or a steeple chase without a goal." But each age has its intellectuals, and the impecunious cousin, possessing charm, found himself admitted to a society which valued itself on " culture," before the word was invented. The " intelligentzia," or the " Left Wing," or the " Souls " of that period were all attached to Carlton House—not to Windsor; Sheridan, who figures in the book as a personage, under his own name, was part of the group to which Frank Grenfell found himself admitted; and Sheridan carried the charming young man into Carlton House itself. There is a deal about the diversions of that time, and a deal about the ambitions—but not a hint of rationing—or of apprehensions. Yet European events had changed even English habits. Up to the Napoleonic era " summer was the season for the country and winter for the town "; but gradually it became " admitted that the troublesome operations of the upstart Emperor of the French might sometimes render it necessary to prolong the session till the dogdays." However, Carlton House was not unwilling to stay open, till the twelfth of August made it essential for its frequenters to say goodbye to Boodle's and Brooks's. With this limitation, inside the compass of these islands everything could go on much as before; not a race meeting, not a prize-fight need be postponed, and the game of politics was still a struggle for what Burke called " jobbish power." It is curious to reflect that England as a whole perhaps never showed itself less admirable than in Nelson's and Wellington's day. We are entitled now to make such an observation, for we are accustomed to greater dangers and harder trials, in deadlier wars; and on the whole we may claim to be facing them with a more decent division of the hardships and the risks.

As an illustration of the spirit in which they are faced I quote this letter from a small shop in London from which I had ordered a fresh supply of stationery; " Thank you for your enquiry. I am perfectly well. Although I've been bombed three times, I've the shop and 2 other rooms I can use, and the top of the house is not too bad; the middle is unusable. I still think I am the most fortunate woman in London—had it been the shop, what could I have done? "

Comment on this valiant philosophy would be an impertinence.

* * * * *

**Italians versus Mussolini**

In *Italy Militant*,* Mr. Ernest Hambloch " rails on Mussolini in set terms, in good set terms, and yet," the rest of what Jaques said will not apply; Mr. Hambloch is certainly not " a motley fool "; but it is a limitation to his wisdom that he is over-conscious of other foolishness. He has both read and observed enormously; the range of his *obiter dicta* is remarkable, but would carry more weight if one felt less straining after epigram: for instance, in regard to the rise of Fascism:

> The actuation (a favourite word with him) of England's leaders was typical. They tried to serve God and Mammon while all that the State Church did was to murmur something about not letting the Left Wing know what the Right Wing doeth.

Or again, upon Mussolini's settlement of the old dispute between Church and State in " the Roman question."

> It was quite natural that on the signing of the Lateran Treaty the Duce's admirers should hail him as a genius who had squared the circle. It would however have been more correct to say he had encircled the Cross.

* Duckworth. 12s. 6d.

ut Mr. Hambloch dislikes clericalism perhaps even more than dictatorships nd he is not at his best in judgments concerning it. Here is better stuff, clear f rhetorical tinsel.

> Mussolini is a worker, the son of workers. He knows that only work can give a man self-respect. He saw to it that every Italian should have work . . . . He was nourishing them on work; not pampering them on the dole. He saved the small property and the small savings of the small man when he came to power; and the small man in Italy has always remembered that to the Duce's credit.

Again and again the book insists that "the Italian has never been afraid of ork"; Mr. Hambloch has seen in the British Consular Service "what North nd South America owe to the Italian worker"; but he finds no evidence in istory that the Italian is readily moved by military ambition or by predatory ationalism. Mussolini, in his view, has imposed militarism on a people to hom it is uncongenial. "His dying confession will have to be that he sought ut the traditional enemies of the Italian State and betrayed the Italian people o their and for his own personal ends." He knew and he said in 1925: Either war brings revolution or revolution brings war." "Well," Mr. Iambloch comments, "war is with the world, thanks largely to Mussolini. It vill soon be the turn of revolution." Quite possibly the revolt against Gerany's domination may begin in the territory of Germany's chief ally. Many eople are concerned to argue that Germans at large should not be identified vith Hitler; it is even more useful to bear in mind the same about Italians nd their leader. Mr. Churchill very seldom lowers the strain of his disourses but he did so when he spoke of "the Italian jackanapes." In dissussing that typical Italian, Cæsar Borgia, Mr. Hambloch writes:

> He combined the gift of cold logic which enabled him to see and weigh persons and events accurately with the unscrupulous dynamism which renders ambitious projects feasible. It was that Borgian combination of qualities—clear vision, lack of scruple, dynamism, and administrative ability that was to make of Benito Mussolini *Il Duce*.

If Mussolini should not be regarded as a potential ally when this war is ver, Italy should be; and Italy, Mr. Hambloch thinks, is much less truly xpressed by Mussolini than Germany by Hitler.

* * * * *

**Readable Philosophy**

We are in no danger of forgetting what we owe to the Dominions for nilitary assistance; it would be hard to decide whether Australia or Canada has given us more admirable proof of its energy as a nation. But now comes a new and wholly unexpected cause for admiration, and thanks are due first to Mr. Shaw. A book bout "The Birth of Language and its place in World Evolution" was sent im by a professor in the University of Saskatchewan. Mr. Shaw read it, nd took steps to make it generally accessible. It appears now as *The Miraculous Birth of Language*, issued for the British Publishers' Guild by Dent t the price of one shilling—for which we get roughly 150 pages of Professor . A. Wilson and 30 of Mr. Shaw—writing with a spring and a swing just the ame as ever. He summarizes Professor Wilson's thesis:

> Man was a baby to whom Time and Space meant no more than the present moment and the few feet in front of his nose, until writable language made Time historical and Thought philosophical. Thought lives on paper by the pen, having devised for itself an immortal and ever growing body.

That sounds clear, like all that Mr. Shaw writes; yet it is less limpid than the low of Professor Wilson's exposition, which marks out man's place in the

order of created things—and his responsibility for continuing the second work of creation. This began when the mental world was called into existence, by the discovery of language. I have neither space nor time here to summarize; but I never read any other work of philosophy in English which was so readable, so stamped with humane culture. Mr. Wilson's chair is of English Language and Literature; he goes readily and naturally both to poets and prose writers for philosophic thought. In particular, wishing to show how literature differs from painting, sculpture and architecture, which must appeal only to the sense of sight by spatial images, and from music which addresses the ear through evanescent time expression, he quotes the lines from *Tam o' Shanter* about the witches' dances. There are movement and action, fixed for ever, yet for ever in motion. Now, I have no knowledge whether this writer is Canadian born or no, and Wilson is not a name that localizes; but I am pretty sure that no man of English, Welsh or Irish ancestry would have chosen this passage—though none could be better for the purpose. Canada, and not only Saskatchewan, has a right to be proud of Professor Wilson; but I think Scotland shares it.

* * * * *

**Driving Round the World**

A very old reviewer cannot help distrusting any access of enthusiasm; but having written as above about Professor Wilson, I find myself ready to affirm that *Vagabondage** is the most entertaining travel book which has come my way for years. Miss Claudia Parsons made her way round the world, very largely on her own petrol; driving a thirteen year old car for close on ten thousand miles. It took her from Calcutta to Tunis, and from Marseilles to London; on part of the journey, her travelling companion was a Mormon psychoanalyst and anthropologist—who seems to have been an early Christian, of the kind that is also a fighting man. He was American. So was the wandering schoolmarm with whom Miss Parsons consorted in Japan. The beginning of her journey was when she bought a second-hand car in New York, drove it across the Continent, and sold it at a profit in Seattle; needless to say, she was travelling short of cash; nobody with plenty to spend would have seen a tenth part of what she saw—or gained a hundredth of the experience. She can describe very well, whether it is the Grand Canyon or the Pyramids; her account brings the North African coastal region, of which we have been reading so much, alive to me for the first time. Incidentally, she has high praise here for Mussolini's roadmaking. But the main charm of the book is in the human interest—to call it variegated is ridiculous understatement. One thing in it stands out. She hopes she helped some Americans to understand the English. She will certainly help the English to understand Americans. More power to her.

* Chatto and Windus. 15s.

**POWER-POLITICS**, by Georg Schwarzenberger. *Cape.* 21*s.*

Centuries of island life protected by the sure shield of a paramount Navy have induced in the mass of Englishmen —and not least the leading figures of politics and business—a remarkable innocence in the matter of international affairs. Only in the last few catastrophic years has it been borne in upon them that in peacetime, no less than in war, the pivot of interstate relations is power. Whether we like it or not strategy is all; and it follows that responsibility for establishing peace after the present upheaval will rest wholly with that nucleus of States possessing the necessary elements of preponderating power — which includes, of course, economic resources as well as military strength. That is the essential basis for clear thinking on the subject of international relations. Professor E. H. Carr in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* has probably more than any one else contributed to our education in this respect.

That is not the whole story, however. And Dr. Schwarzenberger's tome is welcome and valuable for what it does to correct perspective and complete the picture. Professor Carr's approach has been rightly criticised for being purely negative—e.g., his categorical assumption that "power cannot be internationalized" and that therefore mankind is committed for all time to a struggle of conflicting Leviathans (the "international anarchy" of Lowes Dickinson's portrait) such as has produced the present cataclysm. Dr. Schwarzenberger, without departing

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It is not too much to say that this posthumous novel by Mrs. Woolf has been received by the press and the public as one of the few significant works of fiction written since the war broke out. Long and appreciative reviews, pointing out its beauty and power, have appeared in *The Sunday Times* (Desmond MacCarthy), *The Spectator* (Lord David Cecil), *The Times Literary Supplement*, *The New Statesman* (Elizabeth Bowen), *Time and Tide* (Theodora Bosanquet), *The Listener* (Edwin Muir), *The Sketch* (L. P. Hartley), *The Scotsman*, *John o' London* (Richard Church) and many other papers. It is being read by all who care for imaginative art on both sides of the Atlantic.

★

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from his scholar's function of providing "a realistic analysis of the structure and forces of international society," makes the point that it all depends upon us. For all the staying power that they have shown, he reminds us,

> these nation States are not stars which follow eternal laws of Nature. They are composed of human beings. International relations are interhuman relations . . . . It is ultimately a question of will-power and decision whether nations continue to be shaped into relations with each other which make the international society the playground of highly armed and egocentric entities, or whether they are capable of transforming themselves and their international anarchy into a community held together by the rule of law and new and wider loyalties. . . . .

The crux of the matter is in the author's eminently useful distinction between 'society' and 'community.' The latter, he suggests,

> may be defined as a social group in which behaviour is based on the solidarity of members, a cohesive force without which the community cannot exist . . . . if this bond is lacking or is not strong enough to create the necessary cohesive force, the collective entity fulfils another function—the adjustment of diverging interests. This is the essential feature of a society. . . .

Thus the character of a community is possessed by the family, Church or nation; an example of a society is a joint-stock company. Inter-State relations hitherto have been those of a society. But there is no inherent reason why they should not become transformed. Indeed, in our own generation we have seen that outside the gangster-States, spokesmen of Governments, that of Russia included, no longer dare to appeal to national interests *tout court*; they commonly justify their policies on broader grounds, identify them, that is to say, with the interests of humanity and peace; in other words they use an idiom which belongs to the conception of a supra-national *community*.

So much for the constructive side of this volume. It is important for us to remember that

> international affairs are domestic affairs and are finally decided by the initiative or passivity of the citizen, the ultimate unit on which the international society is based.

'Public opinion' has not been strong enough up to date to compel Governments to take a leap from the international society of power-politics into an international community. The hybrid character of the League, as established in 1919, and its consequent eclipse, drive that lesson home. (The author, it will be noticed, uses the term 'power-politics' as understood in common usage, implying an element of arbitrariness and the use of physical force by the contending groups, as contrasted with force controlled by an impartial organ of government in accordance with generally accepted principles; he does not deny that the rule of law itself must be reared on a scaffolding of power). The rest is patient and elaborate analysis of inter-State relations as they are, marred only by the boll-weevil proclivities of the German scholar which make some sections almost unreadable: in particular one is wearied by the continual appeal to authorities. Such evidence of wide reading is quite unnecessary and makes the book much too long-winded. Part III—"Utopia Examined" may be specially commended as a shrewd critique of current peace plans classified under various "patterns." W. Horsfall Carter.

**NEW ANTHOLOGY OF MODERN VERSE, 1920-1940.** Chosen and with an Introduction by C. Day Lewis and L. A. G. Strong. *Methuen.* 6*s.*

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**OEMS,** by Terence Tiller. The New Hogarth Library, Vol. V. *The Hogarth Press.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

**WAKE AND OTHER POEMS,** by W. R. Rodgers. *Secker and Warburg.* 5*s.*

There is little room for doubt about ie variety of poetry to-day, as the experimental quality and range of this new Methuen anthology go to prove. The four books that follow bear this out since the two women are in the main traditionalists, the young men innovators. Yet in their introductory dialogue to the Anthology the editors, Mr. C. Day Lewis and Mr. L. A. G. Strong, who seem much in accord, say some sensible, though not new, things about poetry suggesting *plus ça change . . .*, the most valuable perhaps being the emphasis placed upon listening to poetry almost as music rather than allowing it to be analysed by the conscious intellect. Of course Eliot, Auden, Day Lewis, Yeats and others who are fashionable are well selected, but speaking generally I found in the choice of poems from so many different authors

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an over-fondness for the pedestrian. Humbert Wolfe is, therefore, inadequately represented, and there are omissions.

What can one say of Miss Sackville-West except to praise her? For *The Land* she too claims "a pedestrian measure," but even in that famous poem she often soars to sunny lyricism. This selection must be urged upon all poetry-lovers who don't possess the "Collected Poems," because of all poets now writing one feels most assured that posterity will grant her a continuing public. She is noble and grave and satisfying. She writes in the main tradition, through Virgil and Wordsworth and Tennyson and Flecker, and one submits to the calm authority of her voice, lucid and objective. She seldom makes a personal admission, except to say :

> I have not understood humanity.
> But those plain things, that gospel of each year,
> Made me a scholar of simplicity.

She is clear, concise, rounded, with a gift for superb sensuous imagery. On the lake the swan "illumes the water with his Greek voluptuous plumes." Above the woodland ride

> The stars in bright array
> Stud a celestial corridor
> With golden nails in heaven's blackened floor.

Her scene shifts between England and Persia, but it is in the delineation of English landscape that she excels :

> The autumn bonfire smokes across the woods
> And reddens in the water of the moat ;
> As red within the water burns the scythe.

The few new poems touching on the present troubles are well up to standard.

Alas, I was disappointed with Edna St. Vincent Millay's *Make Bright the Arrows*. Some of the pieces give the effect of journalism. I think she feels too emotionally—undigested emotion—about the war, and although there are a few effective poems, notably *To the Maid of Orleans*, *And Then There Were None*, and *The Crooked Cross*, a short play in the manner of the mediaeval Mysteries, the old ring is lacking. One misses in the sonnets the memorable lines of *Fatal Interview*. There is little wine from these grapes.

Mr. Terence Tiller's *Poems* excited me. One touch of the point of view of Keats, the rift loaded with ore, metaphysical qualities that Keats seldom used, and fine love poetry. Here are originality, sensuous vision, a tendency to revive the high utterance, the glories of language.

> And sailors dream above the steady needle
> And the dark hands of hills drop to the earth
> Their violet wreath.

*Prothalamion*, *Epithalamion*, and other poems have sudden beauties :

> infinite sadness of men
> not, this night, one and quiet with my love
> look down, stars, you illimitable and glorious wakers,
> on her delight that wakes from silks ; her the young moon,
> her bright body stepping to me, perfect unaloof, moving in life ;
> rising with no shame, towards Endymion

But there is much obscurity in this book that is fit for the artist's workshop. I have perhaps a prejudice in favour of clarity, and I would ask Mr. Tiller to seek to clarify his vision because his book is full of promise.

Finally, Mr. W. R. Rodgers' first volume has considerable merit too, but it somehow lacks charm and is a rather

ter, angry book. The writing is ual and not at all obscure, but the piration does not succeed in trans- ding all that there is to be angry out in our dark world. The device alliteration is badly overworked as in line:

eek, suck, sack, such, in each socket set tooth.

A few of the poems give the impres- n of having been so worked over that le of the original inspiration is left. wever, I should pick out *Ireland* for cial praise. It is like a good paint- that stays in the mind.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

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**E INVASION OF BRITAIN,** by Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond. Published under the auspices of the Historical Association. *Methuen.* 2s. 6d.

In a brilliant little book, whose 80 ges might well be doubled, Admiral Herbert Richmond concentrates on plans for invasion of Britain, empts and counter-measures from 86 to 1918, and, as usual, his style is cinct and lucid, eschewing ornament distinguished by its economy of rase. He passes by the major asions which made modern England the landings provoked by baronial dynastic conflicts between 1215 and 09, listed by General Dumooriez in sketch written when a refugee here ring the French Wars. The Master Downing College grapples with the blem of naval strategy which erged when the fighting ship became artillery platform and when in sequence the primary question for a tential invader became that of how


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to save the transports from attack. Perhaps the most valuable section is Chapter V on invasion in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which occupies three-eighths of the book.

Sir Herbert teaches three main lessons. The first is the imperative necessity of fulfilling Queen Elizabeth's maxim - *Aut fer, aut feri* ; *ne feriare, feri* (" Suffer or strike ; in order not to be struck, strike "). This has been British policy from 1587 when Sir Francis Drake singed the beard of Philip II in Cadiz till 1940, when Sir Archibald Sinclair and the R.A.F. singed the moustache of Adolf Hitler in the barge ports. Secondly, we should avoid a 'Maginot' mentality based upon a chain of powerful coastal forts, and in this connection there is an excellent quotation on page 64 from a speech in 1862 by Lord Dundonald (better known as Lord Cochrane). The third lesson is best summarized in Sir Herbert's closing paragraph :—

> Finally, oblivion to, or ignorance of the fact that the security of the country against invasion is linked up with its ability to defend its trade, and that the Navy must be provided with flotilla and cruiser forces adequate to fulfil both purposes simultaneously, has more than once placed the country in jeopardy. A mistaken idea that the strength of these two types of cruising forces is determined by the strength of those of an opponent, instead of by the scope of the duties which they have to perform, has been responsible for heavy losses of merchant shipping and increased danger from invasion within recent times.

DERYCK ABEL.

**CHIUS VINCTA.** Edited, with an introduction by Philip P. Argenti. *Cambridge University Press.* 25*s*.

There is much to be said (and Mr. Belloc has said it) for giving a book a long title, its length proportioned to t volume's weight. *Chius Vincta* ope nobly with a sub-title which reads follows :

> The occupation of Chios by the Tur (1566) and their administration of the Isla (1566—1912), described in contempora diplomatic reports and official dispatch Edited, with an Introduction by Philip Argenti, Honorary Attaché of the Roy Greek Legation in London . . . with preface by Sir Stephen Gaselee, K.C.M.G C.B.E., F.B.A.

Such a sub-title admirably defin the purport of the book while delicate hinting at its solidity. The reader fairly warned that he cannot expect finish it in an evening. The read needs, however, a further warning- that the book is, in a sense, one of Series. Mr. Argenti is the historian Chios and the author of several author tative books on the island's history H intends, no doubt, to write sever more. Events, meanwhile, are addin to the story he has to tell, making h *Chius Vincta* all too sadly topica Perhaps, indeed, there may be a secon (and slimmer) volume with the sam title. Apart from any possibilities that kind, however, the extent of M Argenti's other work has had an impo tant effect. He leaves gaps whi could hardly otherwise be justified.

A difficulty which always confron the scholar is that of deciding how mu his readers may be assumed to kno Mr. Argenti relying no doubt previous and future works, supposes his readers an improbable mixture knowledge and ignorance. General speaking, he expects his readers know the island of Chios already, eith by travel or from other books. Mere from the reading of *Chius Vincta*, an one who has no atlas at hand mig

carcely guess where the island is. He ight finish the volume still wondering hether the island is large or small, nountainous or flat, barren or fertile. lis natural desire to visualize the ene would remain unsatisfied to the nd. This is a pity. The defect is ne, moreover, which the author could asily have remedied. An Introduction hich ends on page cclxxvii might well ave included some descriptive matter nd even, what is just as important, a ap. Mr. Argenti's assumption that is readers must have visited Chios is, urely, unreasonable. On the other and, he is hardly more reasonable in sisting that readers so well-travelled ust need to be told about the history the Ottoman Empire. A public arrowed down to those who know the ear East but without knowing its istory would not seem to offer much eld for publishing enterprise.

*Chius Vincta* falls into two halves; he long Introduction and the Docuents. The Introduction deals with hios under Genoese rule, with the owth of Turkish influence culminating the conquest of 1566, and then (at reater length) with Turkish rule over early three hundred and fifty years. xcept to those particularly interested Chios, the chief importance of this ook must lie in the author's very alanced verdict on the Turkish adminisation. Except for the massacre of 822, the result of a more or less unovoked rebellion, he cannot find very uch to criticize. Despite memories the Wars of Liberation, by which eas of Turkish oppression are apt to coloured, Mr. Argenti shows that hios was not misruled nor overtaxed. e contends, no doubt justly, that the orst feature of Turkish rule was an intellectual stagnation brought about by lack of contact with Europe. The offended pride which led to rebellion was of belated and artificial growth, the result not of Turkish oppression but of 19th Century Liberalism.

> . . . Under the tolerant, if unenlightened, Turkish rule, the island continued to prosper. If there were isolated instances of oppression, it was easier to obtain redress from Constantinople than it had been from Genoa; not only was the capital nearer, but the Greeks also had racial connections with many high officials there, as well as a permanent representative. From time to time, it is true, the Turks gave proof of an underlying savagery; but they were easily appeased, and as long as their sovereignty remained unquestioned they seem to have exercised it with sagacity.

Admittedly, the Greeks were in a position of religious and racial inferiority, but this was modified in practice " by the fact that the Osmanlis were to a

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great extent dependent on the brains and assiduity of the Greeks, in whose hands the whole business and a great deal of the administration of the Empire necessarily lay." Perhaps as a result of this dependence, Chios was always a privileged place in the Empire, ruled through its own institutions and laws. Of these Mr. Argenti gives a detailed account.

Practically all the documents printed, whether from Genoese or Venetian sources, from the Vatican or from Turkey, date from the 16th Century. The lack of 17th and 18th Century material is proof, perhaps, of the extent to which the island was cut off from Christendom. It was through that separation that the islanders chiefly suffered.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

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**LOOKING FOR TROUBLE**, by Virginia Cowles. *Hamish Hamilton*. 12*s*. 6*d*.

While Miss Cowles was writing this book, somewhere in England, she occasionally came to London and saw her former and indomitable housekeeper, Mrs. Sullivan, who, referring to a blitz, said that 'I don't mind telling you those whistles made me stop and wonder how good a life I'd led.' Miss Cowles also has led in a few short years a life supremely good, and supremely well has she told us of it. To be a correspondent on both sides in a war is not given to many people; that is what fell to her lot in Spain and very interesting is the result. El Guerrero's men on the Government side were the toughest of the tough. They were few against many and their chances of survival were limited. Nevertheless 'one nineteen-year-old peasant, who had thrown a grenade among twelv sleeping men the night before blushe as he handed me a bunch of wil flowers; another who had held machine-gun position single-handed fo forty-eight hours showed me a poem h had written extolling the beauties o nature.' When Miss Cowles was bein driven by one Ignacio Rosalles, Barcelona millionaire, on the other side they came to Guernica, where an age survivor told them that it had bee bombed out of existence by Italian and Germans and not burned by th Government forces as Rosalles wante Miss Cowles to believe. At Santande they met a staff officer. 'But of cours it was bombed,' said he. 'We bombe it and bombed it and bombed it, an *bueno*, why not?' Rosalles looke astonished. 'I don't think,' said he 'I would write about that if I wer you.'

In Finland, in Czechoslovakia, every where Miss Cowles is in the thick of it She does not in the least mind tellin us when she was scared; but that neve prevents her from going on. Tigh corners are what she revels in. Bu there is plenty of light relief, as whe Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of th Admiralty and in particularly buoyan spirits, told of a destroyer which ha dropped a depth-charge, whereupo bits of an old wreck had come to th surface. 'And would you believe it, he added with relish, 'there was a doo bobbing around with my initials on it!

It is not by initials or surnames tha Miss Cowles's friends, mostly othe correspondents, are made known to us for she at once talks of them by thei Christian names and the reader i highly gratified by being put on suc intimate terms with interesting folk

ery occasionally Miss Cowles is slightly reless. as when she gives Budjevice s German name and spells it wrongly, or when she says that Old Etonians ldom wear an O.E. tie. Her counter with Hitler is delightfully scribed, as are those with Mr. amberlain and Mussolini. 'I am a ry clever man,' said the latter, most coyly. And of course Miss owles is always on the look out for vealing words from anyone. When e Germans invaded Poland she found at everyone in Berlin asserted that was purely Germany's affair and that ritain and France would never tervene. It appears that Daladier d Bonnet flatly announced that rance would not intervene on behalf Czechoslovakia, whom she had edged herself to protect and this is ly one out of many revelations with hich Miss Cowles regales us. This arless champion of the democratic orld is a lady of whom America may ell be proud; she longs for the day hen her native land will be marching our side. And maybe this book will ring that day nearer. Hess is only entioned once and casually but it ems that before the war Hitler had e idea of coming to London and had dered his plane, but that his advisers ssuaded him, as it would come under e category of a 'state-visit' and volve a three-day stay. 'Just as ell,' said Hitler. 'I know the nglish. They would have met me Croydon with a dozen bishops.' It rather doubtful whether he does ow the English, but he certainly ows his own people, so that he never lows his gangster-bodyguard to leave him, despite all the professed adulation that floats in his direction. How he struck Miss Cowles is really amusing.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

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**A TREASURY OF THE WORLD'S GREAT LETTERS.** Edited by M. Lincoln Schuster. *Heinemann.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Byron must have spoken feelingly, even darkly, when he said, "One of the pleasures of reading old letters is the knowledge that they need no answer." For whatever reason, we all share his pleasure in this particular form of autobiography. Whether the letters are addressed to us personally or published in collections hardly matters. They assist at the birth of events both private and public. They recall and perpetuate the past scene and stir the imagination to dreams of "what it must have been like then" equally excitingly.

This book differs from many anthologies because it frequently gives both sides of the correspondence. This is not so obvious an advantage as the editor appears to think. A good letter will always stand alone. What *is* significant about this collection is the arrangement of those letters which give varying points of view on the same idea or event. Thus, as indicated in the Introduction, Saint Paul *and* Pliny record for us the beginnings of Christianity; da Vinci *and* Michelangelo show us the Renaissance; the French, the American, the Russian Revolutions have each eyewitnesses on *both* sides of no-man's land.

Of course, the reader will, on the whole amiably, pick bones with Mr. Schuster. For instance, favourites and

familiars are sometimes missing. Why of the two Lawrences', include one of D. H. and none of T. E.? Again, the "biographical back-grounds and historical settings and consequences" become tiresome, to the eye for their pages of italic type and to the mind because they interrupt the sympathetic flow between writer and reader. Finally, there is a classification of letters by subject, there is a general, descriptive name index, but there is no plain, straightforward list of authors down which the eye can easily run.

Nevertheless, this is emphatically a book to have within reach to enable you to quote exactly what Macaulay thought so up-to-dately about American democracy, what Mr. George Bernard Shaw magnificently retorted to those who complained that his correspondence with Ellen Terry was only romance "on paper," what Shelley so sincerely wrote to Keats, or what Herr Thomas Mann protested when he "dared to use the German tongue with the ancient freedom." And, only by keeping the book handy can you be quite sure that you are quoting Benjamin Franklin and not Rabelais!

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD.
80 HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND